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Purpose Statement
This publication is by, and largely for, the academic communities of the twenty-eight colleges and universities
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Division for Higher Education and
Schools of the ELCA. The publication has its home at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio which has
generously offered leadership, physical, and fmancial support as an institutional sponsor for the publication.
The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators which have addressed the
church - college/university partnership. The ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation of the Lutheran College
conference. The primary purpose of INTERSECTIONS is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so
by:
* Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
* Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership of colleges and universities with the church
* Offering a forum for concerns and interests of faculty at the intersection of faith, learning, and teaching
* Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives, and learning priorities
* Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses of issues focal to the life of the church
* Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
* Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
* Raising the level of awareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness of their
institutions, realizing a sense of being part of a larger family with common interests and concerns.

From the Publisher
While the primary source of articles for this journal is the papers presented at the annual conference on "The
Vocation of a Lutheran College," we now receive other submissions for it as well. We also ask for permission
to publish papers based on other presentations we hear that deal with "our" topics. In Issue 17 last year we
published four papers that were developed by participants in the Lutheran Academy of Scholars in Higher
Education, and this issue includes some other papers by participants in that academy.
The Lutheran academy was started with generous grant support from Lutheran Brotherhood and the Lilly
Endowment, but those grants have now been exhausted. Fortunately, the colleges and universities that are
related to the ELCA recognized that the academy could be a very valuable faculty development opportunity, so
the academy has been continued with support from the ELCA Division for Higher Education and Schools and
from the colleges themselves. Especially important is support from St. Olaf College, which made it possible
for Dr. DeAne Lagerquist, professor of religion at St. Olaf, to take on the task of being the director for the
academy.
In 2004 the academy has returned to Harvard University, and the leader is again Dr. Ronald Thiemann, the
John Lord O'Brian professor of Divinity at Harvard. At the academy, each of the participants work on
scholarly papers in their discipline, and they also participate in scholarly exchanges about the relationships
between their faith and their profession, and between religion and society, and they work on interdisciplinary
papers, learning from each other both in topical discussions led by the leader and in critiques of the work each
faculty member presented.
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In addition to the papers presented in INTERSECTIONS, numerous other scholarly articles and books have
been published by the participants based on the work they did as participants in the academy. We want to
especially draw your attention to a book written by the editor of INTERSECTIONS, Dr. Tom Christenson, The
Gift and Task of Lutheran Higher Education, published this year by Augsburg Fortress. That volume should
be of special interest to the many people who are fascinated by the topics of this journal.

Arne Selbyg
Director, ELCA Colleges and Universities

From the Editor
It must be that I'm getting old; time is becoming more valuable to me every year and I find that I am becoming
less patient with not having enough of it. And please don't be fooled- time is not money. Increases in salary
are often accompanied by decreases in time. I don't know how my students do it, but some of them lead such
multi-tasked lives- school, work, family- how do they manage it? The candle they're burning must have
three ends. I'm able to dance to only one drummer at a time (and that not too well), and some of my previous
dance partners are finding that I'm already dancing with someone else (or distractedly, as if with someone
else). All of this is by way of saying that I'm looking for someone who's willing to take over this job - I
already have too many others to do well. But it's a job I think is important to do so I hope someone is willing to
do it.
So I thought to post a help-wanted ad:
Wanted: editor of Intersections. Salary, none. Released time, none. Work load, light with periodic
chaos. Experience required, none. Rewards, great ifyou've got a vivid imagination. Everything else,
negotiable. Application deadline, sooner or later.

This issue features the work of three friends and one new acquaintance. By reading what they have written you
may become well-informed about the state of Lutheran higher education, about the significance of the work of
Paul Ricouer, about the implications of being a reformation community, about the perils and difficulties of
teaching ethics. All of these authors would be pleased to hear your comments on their work.

Tom Christenson
tchriste@capital.edu
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Academic Vocation: What the Lutheran University has to Offer
Wendy Mccredie

The tension between bonds of particular love and a love which is open to every neighbor ...cannot be overcome by any
theory, however intricate. Our thinking can only warn against certain mistakes, certain wrong turnings which we might take.
But this central problem of the Christian life must be lived, not just thought.-Gilbert Meilaender

A Methodological Prologue

of both my faith and the institutions that claim to nurture
it. I am called to investigate both confessional and
professional claims.

Faculty, students, and staff at the colleges, universities,
and seminaries of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America (ELCA) live and work in the tension Gilbert
Meilaender describes above. However, in spite of
numerous attempts, those of us who care about the
church-relatedness of our universities have not
adequately articulated this tension to our students, to our
constituencies, or even among ourselves. In fact, central
claims in the Lutheran tradition forestall such an
adequate articulation while simultaneously requiring its
continued pursuit. Each of us who attempts such an
articulation will do so from disciplinary and faith
perspectives that will both neglect and supplement
others' points. None of our articulations can stand alone,
yet each of them coheres around a central dialogical 1
tension between the bonds of faith, on the one hand, and
the openness and love faith inspires for others and for
God's created world, on the other hand. What follows is
one more attempt to articulate productively this dialogical
tension and to suggest how it can promote practical and
useful understandings of the vocation of the ELCA
related colleges and universities.

Being a Christian in the Lutheran tradition means that I
have faith in Christ, in God's scandalous self
revelation-a self-revelation that transgresses and
suspends God's own law.
Christ, God Incarnate,
transgresses the law that separated the divine from the
human. Jesus Christ thus embodies paradox and invites
dialogue between God and human. This faith in God's
scandalous self-revelation in Christ motivates an attitude
of service to that good God and love for my neighbor.
My service is motivated by faith, and God's grace
enables its efficacy.
From that attitude of service motivated by faith, reason
helps determine what is faithful, what I might best do,
here and now. This requirement or call to act is as
universal as the gracious love to which it is a response.
Always, however, I attempt to act with an attitude of
humility, because I might be wrong. In fact, it is not only
reason that discerns appropriate action; it is God's grace
that allows for the possibility that I might be right in that
discernment.

Because profession is intimately grounded confession,
this essay begins with an outline of the determining
features of my faith as it influences my thoughts. The
next section moves away from personal confession to the
communal concern about the future of the church-related
college, and the last sections represent various dialogical
engagements with that concern in a specifically Lutheran
context. What I write here, I write as a practicing
Lutheran and a trained literary scholar. Until very
recently, I taught at a university with "Lutheran" in its
name; I now work at the churchwide offices of the
ELCA. From one perspective, therefore, I write from a
position of insider privilege. From another perspective,
my lack of formal theological training may raise
questions about my authority. In any case, for a Lutheran
who believes the church is semper reformanda and who
is one among the "priesthood of all believers," any
privilege associated with teaching at a Lutheran
university simultaneously constitutes a responsibility.
My privileged position requires a constant interrogation

The recognition of the limitations of and on human
reason may be the most difficult hurdle for scholars to
overcome. To be called to employ human reason and to
act in accordance with that reason, while simultaneously
understanding that reason errs, seems quite silly, even
foolish. If one uses the best tools, intellectual or
otherwise, to solve a problem, it is quite difficult to act on
that solution in good faith, while at the same time
recognizing that those best tools might not be adequate to
the project. Indeed, they might in fact have precluded the
finding of the best solution. Such a paradox can lead to a
paralysis that makes action in the world impossible.
How does one recover from such a paralysis, perhaps
brought on by too much knowledge? Faith in God's
grace makes it possible actually to do what I have
reasoned I must do in order to promote goodness and
justice, even though I know that whatever I do will not
eliminate all injustice in the world; it may even
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imperialist tools; the complaints go on. Bennett's Book
of Virtues, which is sold at supermarket checkouts as well
as in university bookstores, elaborates the Bloomian and
Hirschite themes by providing a list of virtues that will
solve our problems if we could just get them back into
the public arena; that is, teach them to our children.2
Bennett's work does for K-12 what Bloom's and Hirsch's
did for colleges and universities.

perpetuate some injustice that I did not recognize.
Moreover, my witness to my faith, my evangelizing of
the freedom it confers on me, is most true to itself when I
respect the freedom of others. I am not trying to convert,
to make little Lutherans of my colleagues or my students.
I am working in service to God's words of hope for peace
and justice. I do not condemn my colleagues who do not
share the particularity of my beliefs; I listen hard to the
challenges they present to me. I struggle with the ways
in which I and the institution-both the church and the
university-fall short of the ideal community, but I try to
keep before me the gospel, the good news of forgiveness
and redemption.

My characterization of these pos1t10ns and the
descriptions about where we have gone wrong and how
we ought to fix it may be rather hasty and overly
generalized, but the point is, they think we have gone
wrong; there are a lot of folk who agree with them.
Michael Berube and Cary Nelson sum up the situation of
the 1990s this way:

Why worry about our vocation, or calling, to be
Lutheran colleges and universities?
Like many church-related universities, Texas Lutheran
University has struggled to articulate for itself and for
others what its middle name might mean. What
motivates this need to situate ourselves? Are we fearful
of losing students, of not responding to the market, of
ceasing to exist, of leaving the church, of becoming the
church? Or is there something good we do that ought not
to be lost? Are we motivated by fear or by love?

The 1990s have not been kind to
American
institutions
of
higher
education. Academy-bashing is now
among the fastest-growing of major U.S.
industries, and the charges are as
numerous as the bashers themselves:
teachers don't teach; scholars fritter
away their time and your tax dollars on
studies of music videos; campus
regulations thwart free speech; the
Western cultural heritage is besieged by
tenured radicals; heterosexual white
men are under attack from feminist,
multiculturalist, and gay and lesbian
groups; universities are buying luxury
yachts with federal research dollars;
academic standards of all kinds are in
tatters; undergraduates lack both reading
skills and moral foundations; and, in the
midst of all this, to add financial insult
to intellectual injury, college tuitions are
skyrocketing. (Berube 1)

Since the publication of E. D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy,
Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind, and
William Bennett's Book of Virtues, there have been
numerous fairly popular critiques of the American
academy. These books, while at times simplistic in their
analyses (perhaps precisely because of that simplicity),
do resonant with an audience beyond what the public
names the "ivory tower of academia." For that public,
what we do in the universities remains esoteric,
theoretical, valueless, and suspect.
For writers such as Hirsch, we are no longer teaching the
right things, the things that will provide our students,
when they are no longer our students, access to the world
of the culturally elite. For Bloom and his followers, most
of us, with the exception of a few enlightened political
philosophers, are no longer teaching the right things. We
are no longer doing so because we have succumbed to
faddish movements such as Women's Studies, AfricanAmerican Studies, and Gay and Lesbian Studies, all of
hich have a political agenda beyond the academy. All
se intellectual and curricular movements pollute the
·ty of the academic endeavor by the importation of a
· /�mted political agenda into what should be a purely
intellectual endeavor. The syllabus is fragmented; the
objectives unclear at best and politically motivated at
worst; assessment procedures, even the right of
professors to access students, come under attack as

Berube and Nelson go on to document the shift from
concern about political correctness in the academy to the
attempt to define what it is that we should be teaching
there. While Bloom and others lament the type of values
taught in the academy, the latest move in the "culture
wars" is to lament the loss of values in the academy.
Berube and Nelson recognize this double movement as
ironic. They summarize the character of the debates
surrounding higher education as revolving around two
contradictory statements: "[Higher education] has
abandoned its mission by arrogantly seeking to shape
student's moral and civic lives, and, worse still, it has
abandoned its mission to shape students' moral and civic
lives" (Berube 2). Berube and Nelson claim that while
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faculty at large universities do inculcate values in their
students, these values do not correspond to the values
immediately conducive to the powerful corporate and
governmental cultures pervasive outside the walls of
academe. George Marsden, in The Outrageous Idea of
Christian Scholarship, also notes that neutral and
objective perspectives on truth, while still touted as
desired, are routinely shunned in the academy in favor of
identity-driven perspectives. The point is that even in the
large research universities value-free education has not
been available; it's just that the values being taught are
not the values the secular world seems to require. In this
respect the large universities and smaller, church-related
universities resemble each other. For, with some
exceptions, church-related colleges and universities in the
Christian tradition claim that gospel-centered values also
challenge the apparently selfish and self-serving
principles of the capitalist marketplace and the corporate
boardroom.
So, whether we agree with Indiana University's Berube
and Nelson or George Marsden on all counts, their claims
that universities are inculcating values in the students
warrant our close attention. Berube and Nelson's
additional statistics on class size and teaching loads of
professors in the liberal arts at public institution should
also cause us to ponder what truly is the difference
between Indiana University and places like Texas
Lutheran University. For, in the admissions propaganda
from small liberal arts colleges across the United States,
the claims of small class size and individual attention
from professors resound. However, if an account of large
research universities can show that they too can offer
such things, then where will our niche be? Are we really
needed? What claims can we make for a unique
educational experience? What rationale can we produce
to justify our vocation as a Lutheran institution?
As a Lutheran institution, we would betray our heritage if
we were to become a fundamentalist "Bible" college,
although we might find a significant clientele for such a
college, especially in some regions of the country. We
would likewise betray our heritage were we to become a
generic liberal arts college, more or less like any other in
the nation. The only option, it seems to me, is to
establish for ourselves and for the general public what is
distinctively Lutheran about us and why that distinctively
Lutheran character is appropriate, perhaps even
necessary, in the cmTent pluralistic cultural and academic
climate. Why are we called to be the kinds of institutions
we are?

Confusion between the exigencies of the secular and
the centrality of the sacred

The modem university, while we think of it as a
development of the medieval monastic tradition, and
certainly Lutheran education must trace its roots to this
tradition, also has significant roots in the agora, the open
marketplace, of Athens. Jaroslav Pelikan, states:
"Although the ancestors of the modem university are
multiple and complex, including as they do the seats of
learning in many ancient cultures, there is no denying
that the university has deep roots also in the monastery
and the church. Indeed, ...the medieval university was
the foundation of the university as we know it . . ."
(Pelikan 45). The twentieth century university provides
both a contemplative place and one connected with the
public space of the market and politics. Both the retiring,
private scholar or the scientist who spends hours on end
in the laboratory, and the public intellectual who views
him or herself as duty-bound to change society for the
better, find a conducive home in the academy. Our
profession has no pre-established borders that define for
us whether we are engaged more properly in a public,
shared enterprise with, perhaps, certain responsibilities to
established authority in the public domain, or whether our
proper area of concern should be that of individual
intellectual and ethical development.
George Marsden's works, especially The Soul of the
American University, provide an interesting analysis of
the role of the American university in training (for the
marketplace) and educating (with an eye to spiritual
formation) its future leaders. His emphasis is on higher
education's public role. He identifies the post-Civil War
era as the site of a decisive shift in higher education's
goals. The North, having won the military victory, in
large part because of its superior technological and
industrial power, could also claim a moral victory. Moral
and technological progress were linked; the land-grant
colleges were set up to initiate students into the practical
and technological mysteries of modern industrial society;
and the Eastern establishment universities began to move
beyond their missions as simply training grounds for the
clergy. They became the forerunners of the modem
research university and began the disciplinary
specialization we take for granted, and sometimes resist.
Mark Schwehn's book Exiles in Eden analyzes the
historical and cultural roots of the currently specialized
disciplines. He suggests that the American research
university modeled itself after the German universities
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Nicene Creed. It is not that; and if we
act as though it were, we shall send a
charge through the wires that the wires
cannot carry, ending in idolatry or
disaster. (Pelikan 66-67)

and especially after Max Weber's ideas on what properly
constituted studies at the university. That is, in the
university academics aimed for "mastery of the world
through calculation and control" (Schwehn 58). Each
academic discipline had its appropriate tools with which
to fashion its understanding of the world. Weber's
disciplined scholarly activity no longer has as a goal the
universitas; the education of the whole person is not the
goal, for questions of ultimate meaning have no place in
Weber's academy. However, Weber's language imports
to his severely pruned disciplines the moral discourse of
the Puritans and provides added impetus for the liberal
Protestant movement on the American academic scene.

The university culture forms Pelikan's core beliefs as it
does most academics'. We, like Pelikan, are products of
a university system that speaks of its mission to educate,
its moral responsibility to inculcate virtues in its students,
and its expectation that society's leaders come from its
halls. Even in the state universities, according to
Marsden, there is no question that the mission of the
university or college as an institution of higher learning
and research is consonant with the nineteenth-century
liberal progressive mission of Christianity:

In the United States, the language that heretofore had
been used primarily to describe spiritual as well as
intellectual enlightenment was divorced from the realm
of the spirit. It applied exclusively to the life of the mind.
While Marsden identifies the roots of the disassociation
of religion and the life of the mind in American
nineteenth-century liberal progressive Protestantism,
Schwehn contends that this disassociation owes at least
as much to Weber's two works "Science as a Vocation"
and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
(Marsden 3-21). Weber's call to the German universities
to pare all ultimate questions from the core of verifiable
knowledge and the progressive Protestant ethic collude in
applying the language of faith to the knowledge of the
world. The results are twofold. First, certain disciplines,
notably the natural sciences, whose methodologies
resonate deeply with this call for particular, verifiable,
and practical knowledge, come to the fore. Second, the
university, as a locus of knowledge, substitutes for the
church, as a locus of faith. Instead of faith motivating
one's life in meaningful ways, knowledge provides a
justification for action aimed primarily at obtaining
practical results, verifiable and meaningful in precisely
the same way to everyone.

Although self-conscious secularism is a
significant
force
in
academic
communities, its strength has been
vastly amplified by the convergence of
. . . other forces . . .. Liberal
Protestantism
opposed
traditional
Christian exclusivism and helped rule it
out of bounds.
Methodological
secularization
provided
a
non
controversial rationale for such a move,
reinforced by beliefs concerning the
universal dictates of science. Concerns
about pluralism and justice supplied a
moral rationale. Moreover, to all these
forces can be added one ..., the widely
held
popular
belief,
sometimes
suggested in the courts but not yet
consistently applied, that government
funding excludes any religious teaching.
(Marsden 34)
Marsden's point is that the "secularization" of the
university is a relatively recent phenomenon and, while in
its beginning stages it was motivated by a Liberal
Protestant ethic that had gone mostly unchallenged in the
United States, it was undergirded by a belief in the saving
power of the modem way of life, as exemplified,
naturally, by the American experience.

In The Idea of the University: A Reexamination, Jaroslav
Pelikan recognizes the temptation to treat the university
in the guise of mother of the soul, as an alma mater:
Because I have been disappointed so
often in institutional Christendom and
because, by contrast, the university has
been for almost half a century the chief
repository of truth and the community of
wisdom to me personally, and
is . ..
my spiritual mother who has reared and
nourished me, . . . I have sometimes
been in danger of regarding it as the
embodiment of the One Holy catholic
and Apostolic church affirmed in the

After World War II, university scholars begin to
challenge the modem agenda set by Descartes and
elaborated by the 18th century Enlightenment
philosophers.
Foundationalism, rationalism and
empiricism were themselves identified as biases.
Stephen Toulmin, in his remarkable book Cosmopolis,
identifies a double beginning for this modem era. The
first modems, argues Toulmin, are the Renaissance men
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What the Lutheran University has to offer

(and women?) of the 16th century. The Renaissance
humanist tradition of Montaigne, Shakespeare, Erasmus,
Luther and Rabelais ushers in the modem age. Descartes
and the others react to that prior pluralistic tradition.
Toulmin's work suggests, in what is no longer such a
surprising move, that Descartes' desire for some certain
ground from which all knowledge would follow, and
would therefore be equally as certain as its ground,
derived in no small measure from his historical and
personal context. In a chaotic world dominated by
political instability, religious conflict, and seemingly
endless wars that did little to reestablish order, what
could be more seductive than a theory or a perspective
that would enable its holder to reestablish order with its
application?

Lutherans should object, and have been objecting albeit
quietly, since the first Lutheran college opened its doors.
Our educational system is grounded in that Renaissance
of the sixteenth century and the advances of the ensuing
centuries inform it. But at the core of an education in the
Lutheran tradition are the affirmation of the human being
in this world, God's creation, and a simultaneous
affirmation of our essential connection with the kingdom
of God. Thus, at the core of Lutheran education there is a
recognized and theologically complex tension between
the sacred and the secular. In his book Lutheran Higher
Education, Ernest Simmons asserts that "a sharp line
between the sacred and the secular cannot be drawn for
the Lutheran tradition" (33). The public space of politics
and the marketplace must not be divorced from the
spiritual and intellectual tradition of the monastery.
Indeed, scholars at Lutheran-related colleges,
universities, and seminaries ought to respond to the
exigencies of the secular without losing sight of the
centrality of the sacred. "The academic institutions of the
church, colleges and seminaries, carry special
responsibility ...as frontier places for the engagement of
Word and world" (Simmons 29). It is our responsibility
to put the sacred and the secular in conversation with one
another.

Toulmin argues that Descartes' reductive philosophy
constitutes a reaction to the humanistic impulse of the
previous century. He wanted answers for all situations,
not perspectives based on individual experience that
might have been different if the experiences had differed.
Descartes wanted a solid foundation for truth claims. At
its root, Toulmin suggests, the rationalist project is not
purely rational; it is embedded in the social and political
particularities of Europe in the 16th and early 17th
centuries, and the desire for social, economic, political
and theological order that continues to be expressed
through the 20th century. The Enlightenment dream of a
universal human truth, determined by rational thought
and divorced from particular contingencies, proves just
that-a dream.3 Perhaps it is even a nightmare.

In Models for Christian Higher Education, Richard
Hughes identifies as distinctive the Lutheran affirmation
of human being. We delight in our humanity even as we
recognize that humans are not perfect. While we are in
the world (and we love it, for it is God's creation and a
gift), we understand our world to be limited and are
inspired by what is beyond this world. This inspiration of
the kingdom of God helps us to critically assess the
created world that we so enjoy and to recognize its
imperfections along with its joys.

In the current academic climate, some still cling to the
Enlightenment's rational dream.
Most, however,
recognize the inadvisability, if not the impossibility, of
pursuing its ends.
However, the privileged
spokespersons for public political and cultural agenda,
the polis, and the marketplace, the agora, still call for
universalizable virtues that we can all agree on no matter
who we are or where we come from. We need these
virtues, so the argument goes, in order to "get down to
business." It is all very well for privileged university
professors to argue about the contingencies of truth,
about moral and factual relativism, about the inability to
ever completely and objectively know something, but the
rest of America has work to do! Hence, I would suggest,
the rise of Christian fundamentalism, of biblical
literalism, and of unthoughtful recourse to authority and a
tradition (mis)understood as static. The academy,
naturally (and appropriately), objects. And so should
Lutherans.

The Lutheran tradition delights in discovery and
exploration of this world, even as those discoveries might
lead us to despair of the human propensity for destruction
and other evils. These discoveries may also sow doubt
and can lead to the loss of faith. On the other hand, such
doubt can also lead to a greater awareness of God's
infinite grace and a subsequent strengthening of faith.
Because we live in this world, there are, however, no
guarantees that we will experience the latter
strengthening rather than the former loss. This
uncertainty is a mark of our humanity. If we never risk
the loss of faith, we risk intellectual and spiritual
stagnation; we betray our God-given nature.
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colleges?" Some church-related colleges and universities
respond to this question by bracketing it: The others do
not belong to this community; non-Christians need not
apply. If there are no others to include, the question of
inclusivity is moot. This attitude betrays the insights of
the modem era; it also betrays Luther's understanding of
the two kingdoms and his call to us to ask difficult
questions. "[T]he Christian is called to make common
cause with all people, including those of other faiths, in
providing for a just and healthy world" (Simmons 27).

Born out of the monastic university tradition, the
Lutheran faith tradition is one grounded in the search for
knowledge and the understanding of how best to use that
knowledge to serve our neighbor and honor our gracious
God. Our mission in the universities is to continue to
serve the church and to make knowledge accessible to
all-not just to a privileged few who read the required
language. We educate in the language of the people, for
Luther believed God's truth should be available to all in a
language they could understand. Hence, all should learn
to read and God's word should be translated from Latin
into German and other vernaculars. Our universities
participate in this on-going mission to educate. Not all
our students will be Christians (the privileged class in our
contemporary American setting), but all should have
access to knowledge. Without knowledge, how can one
take care of and participate well in God's created world?

Currently, spiritual and moral education are affirmed
"add-ons'; to the primary academic mission of the
university, even at institutions that have a close relation
with their church bodies.4 Many of the ELCA colleges
and universities would fall, or almost fall, into this
description. The spiritual is relegated to the realm of the
extra-curricular and housed in campus ministry and the
Fellowship of Christian Athletes and some other student
groups whose spiritual lives are fulfilled through
participation in these extra-curricular activities. When
we are teaching in the liberal arts university and our goal
is integrated knowledge and development of the whole
person, then the add-on approach is inappropriate. To
eliminate my Lutheran Christian perspective from my
teaching amounts to an intellectual and spiritual
dishonesty that should not be tolerated. Any attempt to
excise reference to Christian (or any other) particularity
from our classrooms, our offices, or our scholarship does
a disservice to our colleagues and ourselves.

As Lutheran tradition resists an easy separation of the
sacred from the secular, so it resists the collapse of the
two. The tension between God's kingdom and this world
remains unresolved. This lack of resolution makes
possible continued dialogue. We do not have all the
answers, but we have God's assurance that not having all
the answers, living with paradoxes, ambiguities, and
pluralism is part of what it means to be human. Our job is
to use the gifts from God in order to do the best job
possible here and now, in this world. Just as our
relationship with God is unmediated by any human
authority, just as that relationship with Christ is an
individual responsibility sustained by and within the
context of a faith community, so our relationship with
knowledge must be an individual responsibility. The
primary community in which that relationship to
knowledge is developed and sustained is the academic
community. The Lutheran universities, and one hopes
the Lutheran church and its congregations, recognize the
ways in which our faith in God and our knowledge of the
world are intricately linked. In an age as uncertain and as
violent as Descartes' century, will we succumb to
temptation and attempt easy resolutions? Will we give in
to the demands of political correctness of whatever ilk or
to market pressures? If we do so, we betray our Lutheran
tradition that calls us to live in the fallen human world
that is nevertheless a gift from God and to be enjoyed and
sustained. We must respond to God's redeeming grace
by leading lives "of grace-filled freedom and loving
service, or joyful hope and commitment" (Simmons 26).

Alisdair MacIntyre suggests that the university is the site
of "constrained disagreement." In order to participate in
this constrained disagreement, students deserve to have
as many avenues to truth as possible opened to them.
Likewise, colleagues can only effectively engage each
other's ideas if those ideas are shared in good faith.
Since we live in the tension between God's created world
and God's divine kingdom, if we neglect one or the other,
we are liable to arrest the dialogue not only between the
two kingdoms, but also between teacher and student and
among colleagues.
Putting the Christian agenda on the academic table is
risky. To engage in discussion in good faith, one must be
willing to listen well to the other side. Nicholas
Wolterstorff says poignantly,

Practical considerations for the future

Whereas for a long time now it has been
the calling of the Christian scholar to
emphasize that Christianity offers a
distinctive perspective on reality, the
time may be coming when it will be at

Obviously, in a society as pluralistic as ours, we must ask
ourselves, "How can we make our universities open to
others and still maintain our uniqueness as Lutheran
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claims to, have the whole truth, the answer, the right that
ends all wrongs, but I might and s/he might.

least as important to emphasize our
shared humanity and the importance of
mutual listening. If what emerges from
the overthrow of the hegemony of
Eurocentric bourgeois white males is not
speaking and listening in dialogue but
multiple
power
hard-of-hearing
constellations, then nothing has been
gained. (Wolterstorff 26)

In our teaching, in our collegial relationships, etc., we
must therefore listen to the narratives of others, including
those outside the Christian, outside the Lutheran
tradition. Those traditions, as we articulate them in
human languages, constitute the law. We respect the
authority of the law, but live in the light of the gospel.
All human institutions will fall short of the mark. In
choosing to work within the Lutheran tradition, we
recognize that both institutions and individuals fall short
of the mark for which we aim. This is harmatia, which is
translated in the Bible as sin and in Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics as missing the mark (of virtue).
Recognizing that we all miss the mark of truth or virtue
or justice does not excuse any of us from continuing to
try to hit that mark. Trying to hit that mark constitutes
our faithfulness to God's self-revelation in Christ Jesus.
The recognition that we will miss the mark sows in us
humility or at least it ought to.

We cannot take this caution too seriously, and we must
realize that in entering the conversation, we agree to
listen as part of our responsible participation. Indeed, our
Christianity itself mandates this listening.
A theology of the cross requires us to be loving members
of the community; it requires us to listen to those who are
marginalized by, because, of, or in spite of the
In such listening, we embody the
community.
faithfulness to God's love that Jesus embodied when he
listened to the Galilean woman, when he spoke with the
Samaritan woman at the well, when he affirmed the
listening woman, Mary. At all these times, he rebuked
his disciples for a too narrow interpretation of his
mission; he rebuked them for their reliance on the law
which he scandalously transgressed. Christ is the
embodiment of transgression that mitigates all human
transgressions. We cannot mitigate transgression; only
God can. Likewise, we cannot know with certainty what
does not transgress, what is right under the law; what is
true in the Richard Rorty's sense of truth.5

Pedagogical and theological dialogues
I am faced with proclaiming my Lutheranness within the
context of a Lutheran institution. It is the privileged
position. I cannot claim that my voiced perspective is
equal among the many I know are represented at our
universities. In addition, a Christian perspective has
been, and in some circles continues to be, associated with
Eurocentric imperialism, patriarchy, racism, etc. It has
sustained many bad things. Now, I claim that the
Lutheran tradition has something good and vital to teach
me and my colleagues who choose to work in institutions
affiliated with the Lutheran tradition. I can make this
claim because of the intellectual complexity of Lutheran
theology and its insistence on dialogue.

In the world of empirical proofs and inductive reasoning,
we cannot get to God. However, God's resistance to
rational thought (or vice versa) does not mean that it is
unreasonable to believe in God or to believe in a
particular self-revelation of God's self. In my case, I do
believe in God. I experience God's presence in my life.
I cannot prove that God touches my life; but no one can
prove that God does not do so. Now having said that
God is present in my life, let me also say that there are
many times when I doubt whether I should believe.
Some would claim that this doubt disqualifies me from
claiming belief. I am, however, reassured by doubting
Thomas-just the last instance of a disciple having to be
shown that Christ's truth exceeds a limited legalistic
understanding of the truth-and by my belief in God's
abiding love for me; even when I doubt, God remains.
Thus, here I am back in the web of my belief.
Wolterstorff affirms that entanglement, as do I, as an
appropriate perspective from which to engage in both
research and teaching. It is an entanglement informed by
both faith and doubt. I doubt that I, or anyone else who

In Exiles from Eden, Schwehn suggests we reformulate
our goals so that we recognize our quest as a communal
one for integrated understanding, not an individual one
for isolated certainty:
Instead of Weberian mastery of the
world through calculation and control,
academics ought primarily to seek
understanding of the world through
communal inquiry. This latter endeavor
follows quite naturally from the
affections of awe, wonder, and gratitude
that together constitute piety. Finally,
the means-end rationality that defined
the academic mind for Weber must be
absorbed into a far more capacious
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epistemology that views qualities of
character, mind and spirit as integrally
related to one another. (Schwehn 58)

He did not set himself up as the authority who could
teach others the right way to truth; he gave them the
means to teach themselves. He did not condemn them for
their ignorance, but facilitated their understanding. He
gave them the means by which they could take personal
responsibility for their relationship to God. We must
provide the means to facilitate such relationships for our
students in regards to truth and knowledge as well as to
God. This is the Lutheran "priesthood of all believers"
implemented in the classroom.

Likewise, a few years ago, Richard Hughes reminded the
Lutheran college and university presidents that Lutheran
theology insists on human finitude. Because of this
insistence, "Lutherans can never absolutize their own
perspectives, even their theological perspectives"
(Hughes 6). In academe, our perspectives are determined
not only by the particularities of history, but also by our
training and disciplinary interests. If we are to remain
true to the Lutheran tradition, these disciplinary
perspectives can never be absolutized.
Since the
practitioners in each discipline participate in the quest for
understanding, we must remain in dialogue with each
other, not isolated in self-referential and self
congratulatory niches of truth.

Finally, the Lutheran church is a reforming church. It has
not been reformed (past perfect), but is reforming
(present progressive). As a member of the church at one
of its universities, I investigate possible areas of reform.
I am responsible for communicating to the church the
view from the outside and modeling for the church how
to engage in conversation with those outside the tradition.
I may not do it very well, but I keep trying. Jesus is my
model. He spoke to the woman at the well-unclean,
adulteress, unbeliever, a person unacceptable under the
law of Jesus' tradition. It was she to whom he first
revealed himself. I must listen to those outside the
tradition because God's work is not done just by people
of the tradition. In fact, the lure of worldly wisdom can
be so strong that sometimes little of God's work can be
done; God's words are not heard; God's love is not
experienced when we allow the constraining laws of the
created world to override the Gospel of good news and
loving kindness and God's infinite grace.

In the classroom, we must demonstrate an approach to
knowledge that eschews any rigid adherence to a set of
preestablished methodologies.
As educators in a
Lutheran university environment, we are called to
interdisciplinary approaches, recognizing the limiting and
limited nature of a single discipline's approach to and
effect on the truth. In addition, within our disciplines we
are called to take advantage of multiple approaches and
to continue to modify our approach to the subject matter
proper to the discipline itself.
There is no such thing as a neutral perspective. All truth
claims are founded on some perspectival assumption.
Even the claim that there is a truth devoid of particularity
can only make sense in the context of a system that
desires a universal, generically human truth; i.e., a truth
that is true for all human beings at all times and in all
places. This was the project of the Enlightenment. It has
failed, but we should not, therefore, turn to nihilism.

This Lutheran understanding of ongoing reformation is
essential to my teaching. Recognizing that my education
(in French, my formation) is not past, nor perfect, I am
freed from the need to be a perfect teacher, always right
and in control at all times. I freely recognize my own
fallibility and am thereby freed to listen to students'
perspectives.
I am freed to try new pedagogical
approaches. And, most importantly, I am freed to
critique myself and hear the criticisms of others, without
those criticisms destroying me or my teaching.
Essentially, I am freed from hegemonic claims by the one
claim of Christ, and once again affirm the paradoxical
situation of being in the world and simultaneously of the
kingdom of God.

As a teacher, I must be aware of the power and authority
I have, justified only by my position and preparation (not
by God's grace). Even though I know that I might be
wrong, my students will not know that; in some cases,
they will not want to know that. My work is similar to
that of any pastor. I am not a priest who mediates
between her students and the truth. I do not hold the keys
..... to the Kingdom; Christ does, my students do. In
eological terms, our students have as much access to
hrist, Truth, and knowledge as we do. We need to show
m that they do have this access, remind them of it in
Platonic sense. Our situation is similar to Luther's.
}Yhen he traveled to country congregations, he was
appalled by their lack of knowledge about the basic tenets
of Christianity. The result: Luther's Small Catechism.

Those of my colleagues who are not Christian and those
who are Christian and not Lutheran and who work
alongside Lutherans in the Lutheran universities and
colleges do so because in large measure they share the
concern for justice and for the non-judgmental search for
truth. This concern, however, is neither exclusively
Christian nor perhaps even particularly Lutheran. Many
of them would claim, like me, that they engage in action
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we live in the world in which the one perfect incarnation
of truth was made possible through God's
incomprehensible, infinite graciousness. This incarnation
of truth simultaneously embodies the transgression of the
law and continues to inspire, motivate and justify our
imperfect aspiring embodiments of God's truth in the
world.

for the sake of love and justice for our neighbors. It is
this commitment to non-judgmental understanding that
promotes action for the sake of love and justice that
unites us. It is we who embody both individually and
collectively the Lutheran tradition. And, as with all
embodiments, except the one in Christ, we fall short of
the virtuous marks at which we aim. We sin. However,

Wendy Mccredie is the associate director for interpretation in the Department for Communication at the ELGA
churchwide office in Chicago.
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Notes
1

I have chosen this term primarily because "dialectic" has, unfortunately, come to have connotations of conflict that must be resolved
through the sublation of one argument into another more comprehensive logic. "Dialogic," on the other hand, retains the sense of
simultaneously unresolved and motivating logical movements. See Mikhail Bakhtin's The Dialogic Imagination.
2
Two centuries ago, Benjamin Franklin also enumerated the virtues necessary for good living. His Autobiography, however, ironizes
an unthoughtful, blinkered approach to virtues and demonstrates that one virtue may contradict another.
3
See Richard Rorty' s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity for an elaboration on the contingency of truth.
4
Michael Beaty, "Perspectivalism and its Cultured Despisers," Baylor University, 15 July 1996, given as part of the Lilly Fellows
Summer Seminar.
5
"Truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences." Contingency, p. 7.
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Dual Citizenship in Athens and Jerusalem: Ricoeur's Hermeneutics and the Promise of
Lutheran Higher Education
Mark C. Mattes
Beyond the desert of criticism we seek to be called again. -Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil.

In contrast with other Christian approaches to the
question of the relationship between faith and learning,
which tend either to isolate faith from learning or to over
accentuate a continuum between them, the Lutheran
approach to Christian higher education seeks to develop a
conversation between faith and learning that preserves
the integrity of each and can address current secularistic
biases that would inhibit the attempt to establish a
dialogue between faith and learning. In an attempt to
flesh out a model of dialogue that can help us better
understand how to model a faith-based approach to
higher education, one can look to the work of the
contemporary French philosopher and theorist of
language and interpretation, Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's
work can provide a model for discerning various
phenomenological elements of dialogue (such as
listening, risk, open-endedness, and mutuality), offer a
framework from within a "neutral" or non-faith
perspective for making the dialogue between faith and
learning a plausible and worthwhile endeavor, and show
how education as a process is a profoundly hermeneutical
task. His understanding of myth as an indispensable
category for interpreting human behavior, truth primarily
as manifestation and not correspondence, and
secularism's ability to dehumanize people calls for a
retrieval of a faith-based approach to education congenial
to the Lutheran tradition. Himself a layman of the French
Reformed Church, Ricoeur offers work that should help
us clarify the educational dynamics that can be operative
at Lutheran-related schools.

that which is outside of faith are permitted and
encouraged as essential components in the development
of the life of the mind. In other words, unlike much
secular-based education, Lutheran higher education
proposes that questions of faith are worthy of one's
reflection; and, in contrast to many sectarian Christian
institutions, at Lutheran colleges and universities it is
permissible--indeed sometimes necessary-to criticize
our presuppositions of faith in the hope of refining our
faith-inspired perspectives. Admittedly, this task is risky
for faith. We might lose our faith in the process of self
criticism. Nevertheless, as it will be seen, if we follow
Luther's and/or Ricoeur's thinking, a faith that insists on
security of whatever sort proves not to be genuine faith at
all. 1
In some perspectives in higher education, faith issues and
questions are thought to be solely a private matter. In this
view, scholars want to preserve human autonomy from
the threat of authoritarianism and defend scientific
research from the challenge of "obscuritanism." Hence,
in their view, faith is an irrational disposition or blind
acceptance of the religious legitimization of social
institutions. By contrast, for church-related higher
education, faith issues are thought to engage the life of
the mind and even challenge our assumptions about
social legitimization. Faith issues are permitted to be
public, even though these issues will not receive univocal
answers from church-related faculties, whose views often
reflect the pluralism of the wider academy. Hence,
church-related colleges should seek to foster both
academic excellence and spiritual growth, and not just
provide opportunities for spiritual growth. How might
this be possible in an academic environment? Issues of
faith are nurtured as much, if not more so, by the
questions that faith raises, and not merely by the historic
creedal or confessional answers that faith has
traditionally given. Indeed, the very transmission of faith
has been sustained by the questions generated by the
faithful. Hence, one should agree with former St. Olaf
College president Mark Edwards that "there should be in
most cases no substantive difference between scholarship
by Christians and by non-Christians." However, one can
assume that the pedagogy at church-related campuses at
times might be markedly different from that at secular
campuses, since the church-related community of
scholars will expect and encourage questions about

In response to the dynamics of disengagement outlined
by Marsden and Burtchaell, we need to maintain that
Christian higher education should indeed attempt in a
specifiable way to integrate faith and learning across the
curriculum and in various facets of student life.
Admittedly, a school is not a church-nor should it be. A
school is a community of scholars seeking to further the
life of the mind. However, the unique heritage and
calling of church-related institutions of higher learning is
to attempt to find ways for faith and learning to connect.
This is a task unique to the church-related school, since it
11; not promoted by secular institutions or by other
agencies of the church. If we conceive of this integration
as a conversation between faith and learning, we can
recognize that both questions addressed to the faith from
outside of faith and questions arising from the faith to
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while the dogmatist needs to see his or her symbols
appropriately critiqued.

various disciplines, methods, and subject matters that
might address faith or be addressed by faith. In church
related colleges, a confessional tradition meets the wider
world of scholarship: this encounter mixes not the
ingredients of oppression or repression, but of lively
debate. Of course, one should not assume that religion
courses required for the baccalaureate degree by many
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA)
schools will guarantee that faith and learning will be
cross-fertilized. As an academic discipline, the study of
religion in a church-related school may be done, indeed
perhaps often ought to be done, from a vantage point of
critical distance from faith, a "second order" reflection on
"first order" faith propositions. However, such critical
distance should never quiet questions of faith for the very
sake of achieving an alleged "academic freedom" in the
classroom. There is no wholly neutral stance in which
scholars do their work. Scholars are always framed by
traditions or perspectives.
In a church-related
environment, questions and issues of faith are, ironically,
a guarantee of the pursuit of academic freedom across the
curriculum, since they are not dismissed out of hand due
to secularistic bias.

The Lutheran
Education

Approach

to

Christian

Higher

As several scholars have argued, different Christian
traditions have tended to construe the relationship
between faith and learning in different ways.3 The
Reformed tradition has tended to integrate faith and
learning by subordinating learning to faith in order to
construct a unified and coherent single understanding of
reality, a purported "Christian worldview" since, after all,
all truth is God's truth. A consistent Reformed position
tends to be alarmed by the threat of secularization, since
it will attribute secularization as resistance to the
distinctive Christian perspective.4 The Roman Catholic
perspective tends to emphasize continuity between faith
and reason since it is apt to construe the material world in
virtually a "sacramental" way as a vehicle of God's grace
and presence. The Mennonite and/or "free church"
traditions emphasize not so much a distinctive Christian
understanding of the world as distinctive Christian
behavior-radical discipleship--a personal, practical,
and unique discipline as over against the world. While
appreciating the desire to relate faith and learning found
in all these approaches and, in fact, sensing a core of truth
in all of them, Lutheran higher education resists the
attempt to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world,
or the desire to insulate itself from the world, or the
supposition that there is an uncontested continuum
between faith and learning. Perhaps less confident in our
ability to interpret either our world or God's truth for the
world than these other perspectives, Lutheran higher
education tends to see its mission as establishing a
dialogue between faith and learning for the sake of
mentoring citizens who will serve both church and
society. The integration of faith and learning in a
Lutheran perspective, then, suggests thematizing a
conversation between the implications of faith for
learning and the implications of the various disciplines in
the arts and sciences for faith, when and where it is
appropriate.

The integration of faith and learning can happen and
often occurs in the outreach programs of campus ministry
centers at state and/or secular universities and colleges or
by various groups within currently demarcated research
arms of the academy. However, church-related colleges
ought to endeavor to bring faith and learning into
conversation in an intentional way in their many
endeavors and venues.
From the perspective of
democratic ideals and free inquiry, such a goal in no way
jeopardizes the autonomy or academic freedom of faculty
or students, since all members of a church-related
academic community have freely consented to the value
of this endeavor by their joining this particular
community of scholars.
Hence, as suggested by
Ricoeur's thinking, the atmosphere that ought to be
fostered on church-related campuses would avoid, on the
one hand, a skepticism that thinks that it is pointless to
seek truth or, in this case, the integration of faith and
learning, and, on the other hand, a dogmatism in which
one presumes to have discovered the definitive truth so
that no further questions need be asked.2 Rather, church
related higher education can foster an attitude of
hopefulness that faith can provide a vision of meaning,
meaningfulness, and even truth in and for the academy as
it inspires students to consider lives of dedicated service
to the world. Church-related higher education ought to
produce graduates who understand the responsibilities of
dual citizenship in both Athens and Jerusalem.
The
skeptic needs to take the risk of questing for meaning in
inherited symbols, despite these symbol's limitations,

A conversation between faith and learning should not be
misconstrued as one between public (learning) and
private matters (faith issues). It is not an exercise in
"values clarification." Rather, it involves the "to and fro"
or "give and take" movement in a dialogue generated by
two sets of possibilities: those of new life granted by the
gospel as they bear upon the life of the mind, and those of
the life of the mind as they bear upon our comprehension
of the gospel. A Lutheran approach to higher education
is guided by an affinnation that the world is properly
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God's, not our own, and that this truth liberates us from
any pretentiousness towards divinity that we might foster.
As people of faith, we can be free to accept our
creatureliness, our ultimate dependence upon God as a
loving creator. As people of faith, we can be free from
the anxiety that can cause humans to be "curved in" upon
themselves, as Luther put it. Indeed, we can be liberated
from our own quest for self-security and in this way we
are available to consider the needs of our neighbors and
the earth. Hence, people ought not to insulate their faith
from the challenges and prospects of the world, since the
gospel frees them to accept their creatureliness in and for
the world. We also ought to be suspicious of any
attempts to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world
since we can never assume, this side of the eschaton, that
our faith can somehow become sight. We walk, as St.
Paul puts it, "by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. 5:7). Faith
indeed should seek to understand everything it is capable
of understanding. Faith is seeking understanding, as St.
Augustine taught us. Indeed, St. Augustine is right to
note that far from faith making one blind, it is rather on
account of faith that one can see or understand anything
at all. However, furthering Augustinian thinking about
the relationship between faith and understanding, Luther
contended that genuine faith is bereft of empirical
measuring. Indeed, faith must be content to find God
under the "sign of the opposite," in suffering and the
cross,5 rather than in security or triumphalistic glory, with
which reason might feel more secure. Guided by a
healthy suspicion in the ability of the power of human
reason to determine or share a common home ground
with divine truth as such, since it is vulnerable to the
onslaught of the "labyrinthine depths of human self
deception,"6 a Lutheran understanding of the gospel
naturally can affirm dialogue as the best model for the
relating or integrating of faith and learning, since
dialogue especially can accommodate the ambiguity, or
the lack of sight, that genuine faith must accept even as it
seeks to make sense of its world.

to education, Lutherans can especially walk freely
because they know that education is not, and can never
be, salvific. While education can help sustain social
health, it can also be a vehicle of systemic distortions or
social "incurvation." It is the gospel alone, then, that
justifies the ungodly, not the processes or outcomes of
education. From a Lutheran perspective, education does
its job best when it directs us away from ourselves and
toward the needs of our neighbors and the earth.
Lutheran higher education holds out the prospect of being
guided by awe and wonder towards the creation, rather
than the fierce attempt to control nature for human's own
purposes. We are, as Robert Jenson has nicely phrased it,
to be gardeners of someone else's (i. e., God's) garden
(Jenson 113).
The wider academic context in the twentieth century has
not always been amenable to the cultivation of a
conversation between Athens and Jerusalem. The
"liberal-rationalist" tradition, as Richard Baepler has
designated it, has looked to the scientific method alone as
a norm for authority and has configured the purpose of
higher education to be primarily pragmatic in outlook. It
discredits the role of faith in public matters; faith, then, is
relegated to private matters. Lutheran higher education
has responded in different ways to this academic
tradition.
The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
(LCMS) schools, it could be argued, have generally opted
for a "sectarian" strategy that rejects many, if not most,
aspects of this tradition out of hand. ELCA schools,
perhaps, have in various degrees and ways tended to
accommodate this tradition. Much is to be learned from
the liberal-rationalist tradition.7 We should affirm the use
of scientific method and the important contributions that
an individual's creative self-expression in the academy
can offer the world. However, the overall record of the
liberal-rationalist tradition is ethically ambiguous and
some aspects of its outlook on the world are incompatible
with the Christian gospel. The liberal-rationalist tradition
rejects external authority and tradition, and affirms a
"common rationality" that presumes that objectivity
belongs solely to mathematics and the "hard sciences" of
physics, chemistry, and possibly biology. It tends to
reduce questions of truth to matters only of verification
within the confines of controlled inquiry and
demonstration.
Since the attempt to specify an
overarching common good is unobtainable to scientific
pursuit, the liberal-rationalist tradition fosters a highly
individualistic social policy. The self is "free" for any
number of ends as long as it does not limit the autonomy
for others. This tradition has altered the terrain for the
kind of education offered in "denominational colleges,"
such as Lutheran schools which, as established in the
nineteenth century, encouraged students to consider the

While historically the Lutheran tradition has tended to be
"quietistic" with regard to the economic, political, and
social "powers that be" that operate in the created order,
and has rightly been chastised for this social passivity,
there are certainly enough theological resources and
leverages within Lutheranism, were Lutheranism to
challenge its quietistic heritage. These powers are
susceptible to self-serving incurvation, our tendency, as
Luther put it, to be turned in upon ourselves. They
should not be uncritically trusted. These powers can be
instruments that further God's good creation, when they
help us to focus on the needs of our neighbors or the
earth. Nevertheless, they also are capable of systemic
distortions when they become self-serving. With regard
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unity of knowledge, human moral purpose, societal
leadership, and the classics of the West (Baepler 48). For
the liberal-rationalist heritage, Athens and Jerusalem
should not be in dialogue. Why? When seen as affecting
the public, faith threatens to constrain the autonomous
self. Furthermore, faith-lacking scientific verification
is viewed by those espousing this tradition as largely an
irrational matter.

In some perspectives, the liberal-rationalist approach to
higher education may be less ethically neutral or innocent
than it would lead us to believe. Indeed, as Max Weber
conceived the goal of the university from its perspective,
the university should seek mastery of the world through
calculation and control (Schwehn 58). That goal, from
the traditional Lutheran perspective, ought to be
challenged. It would be tantamount to ambitatio
divinitatis, the attempt of humanity to be its own god for
itself. It is the exact opposite of living by faith. The
results of our attempts at world mastery have
consequences for the overall health of the planet as well
as social, economic, and political inequities between rich
and poor. ELCA schools can offer society far more by
examining and challenging these aspects of the liberal
rationalist tradition. Some aspects of this tradition, such
as promoting free inquiry, are helpful and consistent with
the mission of ELCA-related higher education. However,
other aspects, such as its inherent individualism, run
counter to the goals of ELCA higher education.
Individualism undermines the attempt to develop a
concern for vocational service to church, neighbor, and
the earth.

In an era of increasing pluralism, the hegemony of the
liberal-rationalist tradition is less secure today than, say,
twenty or thirty years ago. However, it is still a
widespread and powerful social stance in the academy
and it is fueled by the conviction that both scientific
method as a path to truth (as opposed to "superstition")
and personal autonomy (as opposed to the heteronomy of
hierarchical churchly and political authority) need to be
preserved. Surely, the insight that this tradition offers for
faith is that genuine faith must be on guard lest it become
either superstitious or oppressively authoritarian.
However, many scholars have rightly challenged a
"verificationist" approach to truth that tends to pit science
against faith. Indeed, the humanities are relegated to
mere "taste" (about which, as the saying goes, there is no
dispute) from the perspective of "verificationism." While
verificationism has been widely discredited by many
thinkers, in The Outrageous Idea of Christian
Scholarship, George Marsden helpfully designates four
specific objections to it. Since the liberal-rationalist
tradition continues to wield considerable force in the
academy, it is worthwhile to present Marsden's four
points. First, the reliance on empirical scientific models
as the specific criteria for truth is simply misguided since
empirical science is not competent to provide definitive
answers to the larger questions of life, which we should
not assume to be properly configured as wholly
subjective issues. Second, the conviction that all
academic beliefs must be empirically based is
inconsistent, a double-standard; "it [the empirical
criterion] is not applied consistently to other
nondemonstrable beliefs that play prominent roles in the
secular academy." For instance, most academics believe
in the value of equal treatment for all people regardless of
gender or race. However, such a belief cannot be derived
from scientific argument. Third, religious beliefs cannot
be excluded from the academy since many "academics
are religious" and their beliefs will inevitably shape some
of their scholarship. And, finally, verificationism unduly
favors scholarship based on purely naturalistic
presuppositions. Scientific method has been widely
successful in much of the natural sciences. It, however, is
not itself scientifically self-verifying.

Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Retrieval: A
Challenge to the Liberal-Rationalist Tradition8

The need for church-related higher education to move
beyond the confines of the liberal-rationalist tradition
motivates the concern of this paper to investigate and
present the hermeneutical phenomenology of Paul
Ricoeur (born 1913), and to draw out the implications of
his philosophy for Lutheran higher education. Since the
liberal-rationalist tradition is unsuited to provide a
dialogical encounter between faith and learning for which
Lutheranism quests, it then behooves us to seek an
alternative model for education. Ricoeur is not an
educational philosopher.
Nevertheless, Ricoeur's
development of a reflexive philosophy that seeks to
interpret or rehear symbols, myths, and texts in terms of
susp1c1on and retrieval, or "distanciation" and
"appropriation," provides a model of dialogue with these
symbols, myths, and texts, harmonious with and
illustrative of how Lutheran higher education as itself
dialogical can be construed. In Ricoeur's work, issues of
faith are seen as public matters, offering plausible
perspectives on human identity, the nature of the good,
and the nature of the world. Developed within a modem
perspective, Ricoeur's work indicates that modernity
need not entail secularity. Furthermore, Ricoeur's
thinking unmasks a darker side to secularism that should
not be ignored. This section of this essay will offer an in
depth study of the development of Ricoeur's approach to
symbol, myth, metaphor, and narrative in order to reclaim
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a space for the construal of faith and learning as
dialogical, public, and worthwhile.

is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a proportion
between desires and ends, or freedom and finitude.
However, he determined that in order to understand fault,
phenomenology needs to appeal to and then interpret the
mythical tales of the origins of evil that pre-scientific
peoples devised.

Ricoeur's hermeneutics grew out of his work as a
reflexive philosopher working within the French
phenomenological tradition; Ricoeur saw the role of
philosophy as offering possibilities of an increased self
understanding linked to the questions of a meaningful life
and action. While himself a French Reformed Christian,
he bracketed issues of faith in his philosophical pursuits
in order to protect the integrity of both philosophy and
theology.9 For Ricoeur, philosophy should not be an
apologetic handmaid to theology, and theology should
feel its freedom to position itself with relation to
philosophy as it sees fit. His approach offered a self
critique of the Reformed perspective on relating faith and
reason, since he was not seeking to establish a Christian
"worldview." Similar to the Lutheran position presented
earlier, Ricoeur's work implies that faith offers
philosophy not a worldview but a critical engagement
upon its assumptions, methods, and intentions. Faith may
be able to accommodate diachronically and perhaps
synchronically a number of worldviews, but not every
worldview. The standard of testing a worldview for
Lutherans in light of Ricoeur's views ought to be whether
or not a given worldview is compatible with the
cruciform existence of Christian discipleship, one which
seeks to honor God above all things and seeks the
neighbor's and the earth's well-being. An analysis of
Ricoeur's intellectual journey, as we shall see, helps
illustrate an intellectual basis for the viability of a
dialogical approach to faith and learning, and how faith
issues are genuinely public.

In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur explored various
myths that sought to interpret the origin of evil such as
"primordial chaos," "primeval fall," "original
defilement," "exile from paradise," and "tragic fate,"
culminating in the affirmation of a "servile will." In
Ricoeur's view, such myths ironically were the attempt to
make sense of something inherently irrational, the
phenomenon of evil. Ricoeur's insight was that finally it
is only myth that can help us attempt to provide
categories for philosophical reflection about evil.
Ricoeur concluded that myth is a species of symbol-an
extended or "narrated" symbol. Following Rudolf
Bultmann 13 but likewise much of modem thinking about
mythology, he argued that myth must loose its
explanatory pretension or presumed "etiological
function." Nevertheless, Ricoeur contended that the
quest to "demythologize" should not be to deprive us of
myth, but instead to rid it of a "false logos" (Symbolism
of Evil 162), the illusion of offering a kind of crude
"science." In this way, myth can thus affirm its
exploratory significance, "its power of discovering and
revealing the bond between man and what he considers
sacred" (5). Or, as he stated it, ''The dissolution of the
myth as explanation is the necessary way to the
restoration of the myth as symbol" (350). Hence, in
contrast to Husserlian phenomenology, meaning is not
limited to the cognitive and empirical modes of
understanding; it is rather profoundly hermeneutical, 14 an
attempt to "listen" to the dimensions of experience that
would, without myth or symbol, be "closed and hidden."
Since much human behavior is symbolically construed,
Ricoeur's work opens vistas for philosophical and literary
inquiry that are either closed or limited when we focus
solely on concepts alone (as does Idealism) or sensations
alone (as does Empiricism) to help us understand reality.

The key to understanding Ricoeur's view of dialogue is
his analysis of a modem appropriation of mythical and
symbolic thinking. Some modems tend to ridicule myth,
but for Ricoeur myths hold the secret to some aspects of
human experience, if we are willing to engage them
dialogically. Early in his career, Ricoeur sought to
extend the thinking of his teacher Edmund Husserl10 by
producing a phenomenological description of the human
will.11 In order to attain the phenomenological standard
of "pure description" or a transparency between the will
s such and our conception of the will, Ricoeur initially
··· acketed the experiences of fault and transcendence.
hen he undertook to study the notions of fallibility and
. It, however, he acknowledged the limitations of
ilsserl's approach to explain these phenomena. 12 The
: usserlian perspective was far more comfortable with
Qtions like motives, powers, conditions, and limits
er than understanding how human fallibility is
pable of moving to fault. Ricoeur concluded that the
hdition of fallibility is due to the fact that for humans it

Ricoeur contended that far from being irrational, as many
in the liberal-rationalist tradition might claim, symbols
provoke us to think. How are they capable of doing this?
They do this because they are many-layered or
"polysemic." For example, the symbol "defilement"
conveys both a literal and a figurative connotation. The
latter, an analogy, where defilement is like stain or spot,
encourages our attempt to decipher just how similar in
any given judgment the analogy holds. Hence, as
Ricoeur so famously noted, "the symbol gives rise to
thought." This is because the attempt to decipher
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Ricoeur's move from Husserlian phenomenology to
hermeneutics, giving a public status to myth as an
unavoidable symbolic form of human self-understanding
and communication, provides a forum for faith matters to
position certain aspects of human life, such as freedom,
sin, origins, and destiny. It also suggests that the human
quest for truth involved in asking these questions is
meaningful, even though these questions transcend our
finite ability to achieve definitive answers. In Lutheran
terms, the purpose of education as dialogue is not to
foster the life of the mind for its own sake but is guided
by the possibility of nurturing a self-dispossessing life of
discipleship. The primary symbol of the cross, in the
Lutheran understanding, calls people to challenge idols
which they invent in order to gain security and a false
view of the self in which the self owns itself, and to live
"outside themselves" in God and for the sake of the
neighbor.

symbols is a thoroughly interpretive or hermeneutical
enterprise. Ricoeur affirmed that the critical moment of
modern thinking (the heart of the liberal-rationalist
tradition) is a necessary and indispensable aspect of
humanity's process of intellectual maturation. We have
indeed "come of age," as Dietrich Bonhoeffer taught.
However, we are not limited solely to the resources of
this age. We can, and indeed should, "critique the
critique" by recognizing modernity's limits and its
tendency to inhibit our full understanding of reality or the
exercising of our full range of human inquiry. Myth and
symbol can continue to speak to us, if we are willing to
listen to them. Hence, Ricoeur described the
hermeneutical enterprise as a "wager"-a risk that pre
modern symbols can still address us, disclose truth to us,
and reveal possibilities of new experiences for us, despite
the fact that they die as causal explanations for things
(351). In this light, he claimed that it is not possible for
us moderns to return, like pre-scientific peoples, to a
"primitive naivete." However, by interpreting these
symbols, we can hear their truths again.

Truth as Manifestation
Having moved into hermeneutics, Ricoeur must
undertake the difficult task of better understanding the
ability of language to refer to extra-linguistic reality. For
Ricoeur, truth is to be found as manifestation and not
merely correspondence. Ricoeur inquired into the
question of truth in language by investigating the
semantic structure of referentiality in metaphor and
narrative. 17 In order to clarify his stance on language as
referential, Ricoeur appealed to Gottlob Frege's linguistic
distinction between "sense" and "reference." "Sense"
semiotically conveys the intra-linguistic dimension of
language-how words are to be distinguished from each
other in the intelligibility of a sentence as such. The
"reference," however, is the semantic dimension of
language that indeed refers to extra-linguistic possibilities
for human living in the world. Referentiality should no
longer be construed, as the Structuralists conceived it, as
solely an interplay among various signs within a text, nor
as the Romantics construed it, as a reader's reproduction
of an author's intentions. Instead, the text refers to
reality by disclosing possible new horizons of experience
for a reader. 18 From this perspective, truth is radically
reconceived, similar to the views of Martin Heidegger 19
and Hans-Georg Gadamer,20 as no longer an equivalence
between an image in the mind and reality as such but as a
disclosure of possible ways of living or new horizons of
experience. 21

Ricoeur concluded that hermeneutics involves a circular
process that can be thematized as: "We must understand
in order to believe, but we must believe in order to
understand." Faith will wager or risk the possibility that
the symbol can still address the human by disclosing
meanings that can help humans position themselves with
regard to their relation in the cosmos and even to the
sacred. Hermeneutics, in a sense, is an act of faith,
though a kind of "secular" and not a specifically religious
faith.15 It clearly is never a "blind faith." Rather, it is
more a faith like St. Augustine's who claims that apart
from faith one cannot see. Symbols, then, encourage us
to think as we attempt to decipher their meanings for
people today. 16 But thought also returns us back to the
symbol, because we inescapably live within symbol
systems. There is no metaphysical or scientific "second
order" discourse that can dispense with the symbolic and
mythic "first order" discourse.
Since Ricoeur
acknowledged that symbols can legitimate and sustain
oppressive social systems, he listened carefully to the
"masters of suspicion" such as Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud who unmasked idols used to justify social
repression or inequities. Such idols must be smashed in
order to allow symbols to speak (Freud and Philosophy
532). An appropriate way in which to communicate to
others about the truth of a symbol is then "attestation,"
which for Ricoeur has become the hermeneutical
equivalent of certitude in other disciplines ( Oneself as
Another 21). The upshot here for Lutheran higher
education is that Ricoeur's work allows a space for
reflection to open about faith without the liberal
rationalistic bias that faith is inherently non-cognitive.

Emphasizing the impqrtance of discourse as the avenue
to truth-as-manifestation, Ricoeur's work naturally turned
in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s to the question
of narrative, particularly toward the question of
establishing a relationship between narrative and time.22
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metaphysics of the twentieth century,"26 as Ernst Jilnger
phrased it), is that "we no longer participate in a cosmos,
but we now have a universe as the object of thought and
as a matter to be exploited." 27 It is the exposure of this
hidden ideology of exploitation laden in much scientific
and technological pursuit that led Ricoeur to note: "this
same consideration ought to lead us to call into question
the judgment modernity passes on what it makes appear
as an archaism. This judgment in its tum has already
begun to be judged itself. Modernity is neither a fact nor
our destiny. It is henceforth an open question."28

For Ricoeur, time is to be construed narratively as human
time and narrative is to be construed as temporal
experience. He isolated three hermeneutical moments to
narrative: prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration.
Our ability to prefigure our world means that we
approach life with a preunderstanding of what human
acting and communication are. Our ability to configure
our world is our ability to "emplot," the act of "eliciting a
pattern from a succession," that is, to configure episodic
and unrelated temporal events into a meaningful totality.
It is the text, not the reader, who projects a world and
thus enlarges the reader.23 Our ability to re.figure our
world is the ability to decipher the ethical possibilities in
a situation suggested by the text. Education, from a
Ricoeurian perspective, ought to be seen as itself a
profoundly hermeneutical process as it exposes students
to various traditions and canons of critical inquiry.
Clearly, we can also infer from Ricoeur's hermeneutics
that faith is capable of bearing on public matters by
disclosing possibilities for how to reconfigure life in light
of faith in the gospel and love towards one's neighbor.
Truth is insight into the world and human relations, into
new directions for human life, and into discerning God's
will for humans; this reconception of truth parallels the
Lutheran view of education both as dialogical, open to
new horizons of experience, and as humble with regard to
our attempts to comprehend reality. It also implies for
Christians, in light of the power of the God who justifies
the ungodly, the possibility of serving in new practices of
charity in one's vocation on behalf of others and the
earth.

In a sense, for Ricoeur, the nature of the human is neither
fully nor properly expressed apart from some kind of
acknowledgment of the sacred. Technology's de
mystification of the cosmos results not only in the "death
of God," as it was expressed in the rnid-1960s, but also in
the death of humanity. This is the darker side of
secularity, which needs greater acknowledgement in the
academy. When the participants in the universe are
reduced to combinations of impersonal, albeit
interconnected machinery, it is not only the universe as
mysterious that dies, but also humanity as uniquely self
transcendent. Humanity is properly self-constituted only
within the horizon of mystery, wonder, awe, and joy, and
certain human events such as births, deaths, or corning of
age, are so evocative of both wonder and threat that only
religious ritualization offers an etiquette that rightly
responds to these mysteries. Ricoeur retrieved a sense of
mystery to the cosmos by means of affirming the
exploratory nature of myth, and the meaning-producing
patterns of metaphor and narrative in order to help
provide tools for better understanding our humanity and
to critique the one-dimensional aspect of human interest
that technology suggests. He also believed that while
talk of faith is not susceptible to empirical testing (faith
after all does not become sight)-nevertheless it is
capable of being rationally configured. Like Immanuel
Kant, Ricoeur was convinced that matters of faith can be
thought, even if they can not be known. Far from
violating one's personal autonomy, faith retrieves the
possibility of allowing the human to be seen in non
reductionist terms as personal and meaningful.
For
Ricoeur, the attempt to discern possible horizons of
experience from a symbol or a text is a risk, a hope that
being-as-such will or can give meaning to one's life by
venturing or wagering that life-altering possibilities can
be offered or given by the text or the symbol. Both the
skeptic and the dogmatist short-circuit the possibility of
hope because they think they can bring closure to the
discussion prematurely. Neither position genuinely
represents a stance of faith. However, a faith which can
embrace questions, even doubts, fulfills our humanity and
allows us to become ever more human in relation to God,

Ricoeur as Interpreter of Religion as a Dimension of
Human Experience

Ricoeur worked from within a "secular" framework. He
did not see himself as a Christian apologist. Indeed, he
bracketed issues of faith. Nevertheless, he criticized
secularistic assumptions that tend to trivialize faith or
actually repress questions of faith. His quest to retrieve
questions and issues of mystery and myth was solely for
the sake of unleashing the possibility of a more human
and more humane humanity, a possibility which is
lessened when the religious dimension to human
experience is repressed or ignored.24 In an important
.article "Manifestation and Proclamation," he lamented
that modernity "is constituted as modem precisely by
:having moved beyond the sacred cosmos" (61). Hence,
· �Modem persons no longer have a sacred space, a center,
templum, a holy mountain, or an axis mundi. Their
xistence is decentered, eccentric, a-centered."25 The
mifications of our domestication of nature and our de
ystification of it through our adoption of scientific
ethod and our ubiquitous use of technology (the "real
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others, and our own very selves. Hopefully, a Lutheran
understanding of the gospel in the context of higher
education affirms this truth.

The Contours and Value of Dialogue
What then are the contours or texture of dialogue for
Ricoeur? How can Athens and Jerusalem be in dialogue,
if this is indeed what the dual citizen of Lutheran higher
education desires? Ricoeur stresses that we need to
check our modem anti-mythic assumptions and learn that
some issues can only be understood mythically. We
need, in other words, to take the risk of challenging
ourselves and listening to the voice of the other in the
myth. Likewise, Ricoeur teaches us to think through the
new possible patterns of life suggested by various
symbols. Symbols push us towards a "give and take"
relationship between the other and ourselves. Narrative,
for Ricoeur, asks us how our lives might be refigured in
light of a story, implying a kind of attitude of open
endedness as we inquire how a text may alter our lives. It
seems, then, that there are four crucial components to a
phenomenology of dialogue on the basis of our
investigation of Ricoeur's hermeneutics and theory of
narrative: risk, listening, mutuality (give and take), and
open-endedness. These four are not to be understood in
either a temporal or a hierarchical sequence. However,
they do represent the phenomenological contours or
texture of authentic dialogue. First, when interpreters
approach a text or a symbol they must take the risk in
hopefulness and faith to venture that this symbol can
indeed continue to speak. The symbol of course may in
some sense deceive. The symbol or text may, for
instance, authorize or legitimate repression. Ricoeur
would have us test or question this of the symbol or text.
It may provide some kind of "false logos" that would
seek to explain reality in a quasi-scientific way. He
would have us challenge our assumptions about the
symbol or text. We need to be suspicious and yet hopeful
of retrieval as we undergo our suspicion. The hermeneut
falls short of certitude, yet not of thought. Second, the
hermeneut is a listener. Hermeneutics allows the symbol
or text to question us, to challenge us, to provoke us, to
permit us to question and test our deepest convictions and
assumptions. It is risky business indeed! It is an
interplay between exclusion and embrace, distance and
closeness, suspicion and retrieval, skepticism and
attestation. It is in this way that we listen to the text or
symbol-even as we question it. We ask: How might it
refigure our lives and make us different or hold out new
possibilities for us? Third, the fact that we stand between
suspicion and retrieval and reject both skepticism and
dogmatism guarantees that our task of interpretation, our
analysis of the possibilities of life reconfigured by the

text or symbol, will be a process of mutual give and take,
and hence, fourth, an open-endedness due to the "surplus
of meaning" in a text. Demythologization does not have
to lead to demystification or demythication. Indeed, even
scientific method in Ricoeur's perspective, should be
understood as likewise a hermeneutical task, the
interpretation of data and experience in light of models
which attempt a "critical realism," a possible, imaginative
way of representing the world. Ricoeur, like C. S. Lewis,
teaches Christians to affirm the mythic character of their
primary narratives. Gary Dorrien, interpreting Lewis
says, "If the Christ myth is true in the way that it claims
to be true, it stands to other myths as the fulfillment of
their promise and truth. It is not an illustration of mythic
truth, but the ground of its possibility and the realization
of its fragmentary glimpse of the Real"29 In this regard,
Lutherans need, at times, to look to the work of Thomas
Aquinas as a model in the art of Christian dialogue.
While risking his own faith by bearing the brunt of some
incompatible aspects of Aristotelianism with orthodox
Christian faith, Aquinas was also able to discern various
degrees of truth in Aristotle that he believed Christians
must appropriate. Likewise, contemporary Christians
will look to thinkers as diverse as Stephen Hawking and
the Buddha in their quest for truth, even though these
thinkers will challenge Christian faith while giving great
insights about life and the world.
What then does Ricoeur have to teach us about the value
of dialogue for church-related education? In Ricoeur's
perspective, issues of faith can engage the public arena;
they are no longer positioned by the "liberal-rationalist"
tradition. A dialogical approach to faith deals with public
matters by allowing scholars to reflect on religious
symbols and narratives with an eye to their impact upon
public life. In the context of the church-related college,
this discussion allows for how Christian narratives might
suggest new horizons of interpreting experience. It
should be clear that dialogue about matters of faith and
public life sometimes takes the voice of argument and
criticism. For both Lutherans and Ricoeurians, the
Christian scholar must often internalize important
criticisms of the Christian tradition made from outside
the tradition and seek to defend or revise the stance of
Christian faith. However, at other times, both Lutherans
and Ricoeurians recognize that the Christian scholar must
unmask secularity as itself offering an alternative faith
stance in opposition to and certainly no more justifiable
than Christianity. With dialogue, the Christian scholar
will seek to be as charitable as possible to the stances of
the non-Christian and extra-theological disciplines. Even
ethicists, in a sense, can teach chemistry, since the
attitudes they express about the discipline of chemistry
and how chemicals are best used offer important ideas for
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students to wrestle with. Since Christian scholars
recognize the world as God's world, even though this
truth is not universally acknowledged, they will seek to
build as many bridges as are possible with non-Christian
faith stances and extra-theological disciplines. They will
risk, listen, seek mutuality, and open-endedness in their
quest. Some features of the Christian perspective,
however, will remain non-negotiable in this discussion.
Christians might deliberate about how to accomplish
practices of peace in the world. However, they will not
debate the truth that peace is a goal that ought to be
achieved. In the Lutheran perspective, the scholar as a
Christian disciple will build such bridges between
disciplines and amongst people in order to be Christ to
and serve the "neighbor" in the context of the academy.
Both accomodationist and sectarian strategies towards
modernity short circuit dialogue, since they tend to
collapse the dialogue to a monologue, over-prioritizing
only one voice of the conversation. Lutheran higher
education will be best served when it charts a path
between these extremes. Lutheran higher education can
fulfill this task because it expresses the freedom. to
transgress boundaries established by Weberian
orthodoxies in the academy. Instead of favoring the
Weberian prioritization of instrumental reason and its
concomitant "fact-value" split, the pedagogy of Lutheran
higher education will sustain itself by raising those
irrepressible questions about human destiny, purpose, and
service to God and neighbor.

This side of eternity, we need to be very humble in how
we relate faith to learning. Our construction of models of
reality, even within theology, fail isomorphically to
correspond to reality. The Lutheran position of
attempting to establish a dialogue between faith and
learning honors the ambiguity that men and women of
faith actually experience in their current pilgrimage.
Nevertheless, worldviews will be constructed, especially
within the academy. Christians should join in the task of
building them. To the conversation, they will bring a
"discretion of spirits" (1 John 4: l); they will raise
questions of how the ultimate or God is named and
served, how the neighbor's needs are met, and how
stewardship of the earth is best done. The Lutheran quest
to establish this dialogue is a vigorously Christian, albeit
a humble, endeavor. The Lutheran educational insights
that ( l) dialogue between faith and learning is an
appropriate endeavor, (2) the world can be affirmed as an
arena of creative, spiritual activity, and (3) self-critique is
important in all our activities, can be furthered as we
have seen, by an encounter with Ricoeur' s hermeneutics
of suspicion and retrieval, the plausibility of myth as
disclosing truth, and the attempt to dialogue with the
other.
The Lutheran church 1s a confessional church.
Throughout its symbolic writings we encounter the
phrase "we believe, teach, and confess." In the school,
the church risks her confessional heritage. She is willing
to bracket it in order to listen to critiques and to discern
how to engage the gospel with the life of the mind. This
endeavor is a necessary venture, if Christians are to
continue their earthly pilgrimage in faith in God and in
service toward the neighbor. In the academy, the
contemporary Christian is no different than Abraham
who hears and obeys God's call, not knowing where he
or she will arrive. This legacy is worth our while to
transmit to our youth and also to model before the world.
In light of the inroads of the liberal-rationalist tradition in
ELCA schools, the challenge for many of our colleges
will be to create a space for this unique dialogue to occur.
One might well wager that those institutions which seek
to retrieve this calling will find their academic journey
adventurous, rewarding, and true to their calling.

Conclusion

Again, why should the church support institutions of
higher learning? How can the church fulfill its mission
through them? We might be tempted to think that the
attempt to establish a "Christian worldview" would be
the best answer to this question. However, following
both Luther's and Ricoeur's thinking, it is clear that
simply because a scholar uses "Christian" data or
attempts to devise a "Christian" method for seeking truth,
a "Christian" worldview is not guaranteed. However, is
not the attempt to establish such a worldview
presumptuous, in light of the gospel? Our faith will
·· become sight at the eschaton-but only at the eschaton.
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Notes
1

L. DeAne Lagerquist has shared with me the insight that for many Lutherans, the Lutheran tradition in higher education functions as
a compass that orients our outlook on the world and not a map that would seek a totalizing perspective.
2
In his article "Philosophy and the Unity of Truth,"Ricoeur claims "If all history engenders a degree of skepticism, every claim to
truth fosters a degree of dogmaticism. From this point of view, history would only be a history of errors and truth would be the
suspension of history." See History and Truth, trans. C. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 42.
3
The following discussion is dependent onRichard T. Hughes and William B. Adrian's Models for Christian Higher Education:
Strategies for Success in the Twenty-First Century (GrandRapids: Eerdmans, 1997).
4
See Ernest L. Simmons, Lutheran Higher Education: An Introduction for Faculty (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 31.
5
Hence in The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer and 0.R. Johnston (New York: Fleming H.Revell, 1957), 101, Luther wrote,
" ... faith's object is things not seen. That there may be room for faith, therefore, all that is believed must be hidden. Yet it is not
hidden more deeply than under a contrary appearance of sight, sense and experience. Thus, when God quickens, He does so by killing;
when he justifies, He does so by pronouncing guilty; when he carries up to heaven, he does so by bringing down to hell." Consider
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Reflections on Lutheran Identity on Reformation Sunday
Thomas W. Martin
Stories of beginnings are, like the fields of force reaching
out from the quantum void, vehicles of immense and
superhuman power. Just as these fundamental physical
forces, which although hidden away deep within the
universe's subconscious, are capable of controlling the
actions of galaxies and atoms, mythic stories reach from
their primal vortices to exert their forces on our images of
ourselves and our sense of order and purpose in the
universe. The mythic casts within which we rehearse
varied aspects of our always occurring beginnings give
shape to life, purpose to action, meaning to living and,
when shared by whole cultures or subcultures, sanction to
social structures and mores. Such myths have been with
us, as near as anthropologists can tell, since the
beginning. From the Ennuma Elish to The Boston Tea
Party such stories have served to legitimate identities and
produce seemingly self-existent frames of reference by
which we anchor our thinking and very existence. They
also enable us to ignore or subsume the thinking, or even
existence of those who differ from us.

My experience of Reformation Sunday this year began
with a disconcerting moment. The celebrant called us to
begin worship by saying, "Today the Church gathers to
celebrate the Reformation."
Instantaneously I
experienced an intellectual vertigo as my mind teetered
on the brink of a chasm filled with variant definitions of
church. None of my Roman Catholic friends had this
particular Sunday marked on their calendars. (They don't
even celebrate Counter Reformation Sunday!) I briefly
wondered how many of the world's Orthodox Christians
are aware that a thing called The Reformation took place,
or could name its major players. My mind recoiled at the
thought that those in the Anabaptist tradition, whose
ancestors Lutherans tortured and killed in the name of
Jesus had much to celebrate with us. I struggled to try
and name even other mainstream Protestant
denominations that marked this day with such finely
focused festival. I tried desperately to remember from
when I was a United Methodist pastor, still blissfully
ignorant in his Arminianism that he was predestined to be
a Lutheran, if Methodists made much of Reformation
Day. But I could not remember having ever told my
congregation we had gathered to celebrate Reformation
Sunday. Would those in the Reformed tradition be
celebrating the same things I was meant as a Lutheran to
be celebrating? (And if they did, wouldn't John Calvin be
watching somewhat uncomfortably from Heaven?) What
exactly were we celebrating for The Church? And why
was I having such a difficult time imagining all the
Church as seeing the same (or any) celebratory content in
the Reformation? All this flashed through my mind
before the Brief Order of Confession, like one's life
replaying itself just before death.

On Reformation Sunday as Lutherans we gather to
rehearse our foundational myths. We tell the story, in
narrative and abstract doctrine, which serves as the basis
of our identities and provides the lens through which we
view our God, our Church, and those around us. It is a
story whose immense force in shaping our lives achieves
an inertia in driving us, often unaware, toward the future.
If we are to reflect critically on our Lutheran myths, to
judge their power for good or ill, it is important first to
note that it is innately human to see the speck in someone
else's eye before noticing the log in one's own. The
other's1 myth is always easily debunked, seen through.
One's own myths stand as self-evidently true, opaque,
obviously just the way things are. It has been easy for
most Americans to see the foibles of Marxist economics.
Yet a significant majority of us accept the myths of
market driven consumer capitalism and its attendant
economic theory as simply exhibiting the facticity of
universal laws. It is similarly difficult, if not impossible,
for us Lutherans to see being simultaneously saints and
sinners, or dividing our lives into two paradoxically
related kingdoms as anything other than just the way
things are. To return to the allusion to Jesus' words
which began this paragraph, "criticism of myths should
begin at home," or, perhaps, "people who live in mythic
constructs shouldn't throw bricks."

Anyone even slightly aware of ecumenical moves in the
past decades will object that this is much too complex a
topic to fit between the Greeting and the Brief Order. I
have left out a great deal. First, I need to make clear that
I am speaking from my experience. My life has played
out in formal relationship to four different Protestant
denominations (currently ELCA) and in informal
relations with many others. I am reflecting on my sense
of grass-roots understandings and celebrations of
Reformation Sunday, not the way in which this festival
Sunday is viewed by clergy types intimate with liturgical
calendars and ecumenical committees. Reformation Day
does appear on the calendars of a significant number of
Protestant churches. However, in a brief and nonscientific survey of on-line calendars I found it often to
be printed parenthetically. Lutheran celebration of
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Reformation Sunday is anything but parenthetical! Thus
not being able to recall a single Sunday as a Methodist
pastor having formally focused liturgy and sermon on the
Reformation, even though it was most likely printed on
denominational calendars, is not surprising. Methodists
just don't identify with the Reformation as Lutherans do.
And in meetings with clergy colleagues, I don't
remember it as topic of conversation. ("I need new ideas
for Reformation sermons. Got any?") In my five years
as a member of the Church of England, All Saints always
trumped the Reformation. (I am, tongue-in-cheek,
doubtful that many Lutheran laity even know that All
Saints is a liturgical day!)

The real issue is, of course, not the importance of the
Reformation and Luther's magisterial place in starting it,
nor is the issue the choice of a festival day to focus such
importance. Luther must be somewhere in anyone's list
of top ten theologians. He ranked quite high in Time
Magazine's list of most important people for the last
millennium (but then so did Aquinas).
Although
Protestantism could have arisen from other persons and
events, we cannot ignore that it in fact began with Luther.
All Protestants owe him a debt. Catholics cannot ignore
the historical impact he has had on their beliefs and
structures as well. All of this goes without saying.
The issue is how the myth is told, framed, celebrated; it is
the significance drawn from the story. Roman Catholics
almost certainly tell the story with an emphasis on the
present, and reconciliation.3 It is a day to celebrate
healing of past wounds and misunderstandings. From a
Catholic theological perspective it is not that Catholic
doctrine has changed. It is the recognition that common
vocabulary and frameworks now exist which allow us to
see that we were always trying to say the same thing, but
in differing keys. The Reformation was, in one sense, a
talking-past one another. We now celebrate talking-to
one another. My experience of Lutheran celebrations is
quite different. The focus tends to be on the past. The
locus of holiness and sanctity is on a "then," which we
try to recapture for our "now." Some Lutheran laity (and
some clergy) I have spoken with saw the Joint
Declaration more as a they-finally-got-it, a see-we-were
right-all-along.
The myth, even after the Joint
Declaration, was celebrated to confirm superiority with
its attendant separation.

I am certain that my Roman Catholic friends are unaware
of our premier Sunday for similar reasons. Yes, a year
ago Roman Catholics and Lutherans signed an historic
accord. Catholics now have on their liturgical calendar
"Reformation/Reconciliation" Sunday. Yet when I talk
with real Catholics who fill Roman pews on Sundays it is
not in their awareness. If it is being celebrated in their
churches it went unnoticed by large numbers. Other
celebrations trump their awareness of our Lutheran day.
These thoughts having interfered with listening to the
readings the sermon pulled me back into the service and
answered many of my questions, at least the ones about
what we were celebrating. It was an articulate and
creative rehearsal of the gifts Luther brought to the
Church.2 It laid out in enlightening prose and apt
metaphor issues of conuption set against theological
insights of grace and faith which exposed the abuses.
The speaker's story told of the restatement of an age-old
Pauline-Augustinian theology which was God's
prescription for healing the abuses that had crept into the
Church. The sermon went on to ask the ongoing question
of Lutheranism, "Given such underserved grace freely
bestowed upon the vilest of sinners who continue to be
sinners, just how is it we live out the need to behave
ourselves?" We do so in the paradox, of course, of being
simultaneously both saints and sinners. We live the life
of grace in the struggle of being what we are not. All
good Lutheran stuff!

Although told as if this was a new experience this
Reformation Sunday, in truth the story reveals an
ongoing struggle I have with my Lutheran identity. I am
in many ways disadvantaged in achieving the elusive
goal of a being a good Lutheran. One is that I am a
biblical scholar/theologian. I live in a professional
relationship with a book that continues to astound me
with its ability to say one thing in a first reading and
something very different in the second or hundredth
reading. A multivalent (perhaps, infinitely-valent) God
uses the Bible I read to consistently step outside my
hermeneutical frames to say the unexpected, to say things
my theologically preconceived gospel sometimes says
God can't say. The God of the texts I read professionally
is sometimes a Jew, or a Baptist, sometimes a Catholic,
often Orthodox, and frequently Lutheran, but never
settles into any one viewpoint. Seeing both, indeed all,
sides of a text is a curiously de-centering, unnerving
practice. And this cubist dismantling of theologically
unified views to see all sides of a thing also applies to

My (formerly Wesleyan) heart was strangely warmed, if
not perfected. This was a festival Sunday. We genuinely
have much to celebrate. The world was righted, the
vertigo gone. Once again neatly opaque my Lutheranism
anchored my universe. Or did it? Experiences of seeing
through are not so easily exorcised.
The initial
experience of this festival Sunday would not go away,
even though it struck such a convenient paradoxical
balance with the exposition of Lutheran theology.
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Christian squabbles and so convinced of the abject failure
of Christianity to provide answers to life that it has yet to
recover from the ensuing wave of secularism. From any
viewpoint, the Reformation was a mixed bag. Indeed, a
Lutheran take may be a satisfying analysis. So full of
hope, promise and good the Reformation, under the
tutelage of human sinfulness, became a tool of both
divine grace and demonic hate.

how I look at the founding myths of Lutheranism in its
reading/telling of the theological and historical stories of
the Reformation.
A curious feature of foundational myths is the way in
which they frequently hide or obfuscate a dark side of the
events they celebrate. Those of us who came of age
during Vietnam and Watergate will never again hear the
myths of American origins in the same way. This is true
even if, post 9/11, we might like to recapture some small
part of a patriotic naivete. The realities behind our
founding national myths were, in fact, less about freedom
and justice and more about privileged and advantaged
white-males seeking a still more privileged institutional
structure to be able to exploit more effectively their
advantages over others and the environment than the
British Crown and Parliament were willing to allow. Our
nation's founding myths fail to speak of American
Patriots set over against American Loyalists and the
silencing of the latter in the myth telling process. We
silence the Native Americans who fought for the British
having prophetically seen that the revolutionary rhetoric
of freedom and justice would not be for them. Our
stories, in their orthodox form, fail to speak of an
uncompromising militant belligerency intent on its own
way no matter what. What dark secrets fail to be told in
our recounting of the Reformation in its guise as the
foundational myth of Lutheranism?

It is also problematic that Luther himself was such a truly
mythic figure. Diverse in his thinking, prolific in literary
output, shifting costumes throughout life, his theology
developing and shifting across his life, and with a flair for
flamboyance and over statement Luther's legendary
status even during his lifetime was already writ larger
than life. The shear mass of materials, stories and first
and second hand accounts creates an historical problem
similar to that encountered in attempting to understand
Jesus. The discontinuity between the Luther of history
and the Reformer of Faith is real, even if Lessing's great
ugly ditch is not quite as great or ugly. As the Father of
Protestantism Luther's person and thought belong not
only to Lutherans, but to countless others who follow his
legacy.
The diversity of appropriation of both his person and
thought mean that there are multiple interpretations of
just who he was and what his ideological legacy should
be. Baptists can in some measure own an interpretation
of Luther, even though they don't always self-identify as
Protestants. If I were Baptist I would find it hard to
forgive, even after 500 years. But time eases hurt and
Baptists can identify with the fact that "Luther was a
radical."7 Radical?! That isn't the Luther I meet in
Lutheran circles. That Luther is almost always distanced
by parsecs from anything smacking of radicality (which
still includes anything remotely Anabaptist). Methodist
wouldn't exist without Wesley's auditory experience of
Luther's Preface to Romans, yet the Luther I knew as a
Methodist was colored like Menno Simmons. This is not
the Luther I have met since becoming a Lutheran. Such
a mythic figure, capable of multiple appropriations from
various interpretive frames, cannot be monopolized.
Diversity of interpretation will follow in such a person's
wake. The Reformationt Luther was a part of are much
more complex than Lutherans, or even Protestants in
general have allowed. 8 All tellings of the story are thus
selective. And there's the rub.

For all the good Luther unleashed, he also helped in
birthing unspeakable horrors. He (we Lutherans) was
(are) no less culpable in the sin of schism than was Pope
Leo. The oft trumpeted sincerity of Lutherans in efforts
to avoid schism does not lessen the culpability. In the
end both sides schismed. It takes two to tango. This is
true, even if in historical judgment, as a post-colonial
analysis might suggest, a greater burden is placed on the
Papacy because of its institutional power. The Pandora's
Box, Luther himself only wanted to crack open, was
opened nonetheless. In the wake of the Reformation the
Body of Christ has been hopelessly fragmented. So
much so that one of the chief tasks of post-modem
theology has been to remake a vice into a virtue. The
Reformation for all its good, spawned more than a
century of religious warfare in which millions died in the
name of Jesus.4 Protestants killed Catholics, Catholics
killed Protestants and everybody killed Anabaptists. 5
Even though the historical causation of these events is
incredibly complex, it is at least true that this horrendous
evil occurred because each side insisted that somehow
their reading of God was privileged, their foundational
myth alone was sacred. 6 They claimed their definition of
gospel exhaustive and full to the exclusion of other
insights. Europe emerged from the carnage so tired of

We have learned from Michel Foucault that all human
activities are in some way tainted with desire for power.
Human telling of the most holy stories for the purest of
expressed intentions nevertheless can hide latent plays for
power and control over others.
The complexity of
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Luther, his thought and legacy contribute to the dark side
of our foundational myths when we insist on rehearsing
the story to support our theological constructs,
institutions, history, denominational clout, and to bolster
our membership roles to the implied exclusion of
differing theologies and institutions which, in some
manner different than ours, also look to Luther for at least
partial inspiration for their existence.

Catholics, Episcopalians, and a host of other Christian
viewpoints in my classroom or my teaching would be a
failure. The classroom necessitated that there had to be
some sort of mere Christianity we were all trying to get at
and to which each was contributing differing pieces. I
could not simply teach Lutheranism as the viewpoint,
even though I worked hard to ensure that this view was
well comprehended.

It is to be expected that the dark side would be
suppressed in our celebration of the Reformation Myth.
Such a telling of the myth would have a tendency to
undermine the ideological means by which we construct
our Lutheran identities. We want to be the guys in the
white hats. It was, of course, others who are culpable for
the evils of the Reformation. If only they had listened to
us, all this could have been avoided!

In this light we decided to ask candidates two related
questions. First, what does the Church Catholic need to
learn from the Lutheran tradition? Hardly any of the
card-carrying Lutheran Ph.D.s we interviewed found this
difficult. Then we asked, "What do Lutherans need to
learn from other Christian denominations?" Many
candidates choked. Others began to talk incoherently and
Some almost immediately said,
unconvincingly.
"Nothing!" The few who spoke articulately to this
question made the cut. I found it surprising that so many
Lutheran trained theologians were unable to see the rest
of the Church as a gift to us, and that their vision ended
with our Lutheranism as the only gift God had given the
Church.

So just how should this myth be told? Mythic origins can
be told over and against the other. This is, it would
seem, the normal way in which they have functioned in
human history. One group tells its story of good and
right over and against the outsider, the evildoer, and the
unenlightened. In sociological analysis, this is simply
good strategy for building group identity and cohesion.
Well-defined group boundaries over against other groups
in the environment are necessary for group survival. And
when God's truth is what's at stake in the group's
survival, well, this becomes serious business indeed.
These latent needs for institutional continuance lurk
unseen in our appropriation of our history. So, our
Reformation myth continues to be told in ways that set us
over and against other Christians; continues to be
rehearsed so that our institutional structures are
strengthened, keeping our fences repaired, and our gates
guarded. It can do so even as we work to be more
ecumenical. Can we tell our foundational myth another
way?

James Sanders, has, in the context of understanding early
Christian-Jewish relations, spoken of two types of
reading: constitutive reading and prophetic reading. 10
Constitutive reading assumes that the blessings of
scripture are directed to one's own group and the
curses/challenges of scripture are directed to outsiders. It
is a reading which builds group confidence in the idea
that group membership equates with access to the truth
and right living. Prophetic reading takes as its stance an
internal hermeneutic of suspicion in which the negatives
of scripture could be read as applying to "us." We all
usually wish to identify with the good guys in a story.
We read of the disciples and say, "That's us!" We look
at the Pharisees and say, "Wow! They are bad."
Prophetic reading is to say, "We're the Pharisees. Help!"
It is a reading which takes seriously the possibility that
standing within a tradition one could challenge the
tradition itself as insufficient or perhaps even wrong.
(Lutherans are always ready to acknowledge this stance
vis-a-vis our status as sinners, but tend to be blind to its
critique of the self-righteousness we find in having good
theology.) Prophetic reading is to acknowledge the
failure inherent in one's own ideological positionality.

I would suggest that as Lutherans in our corporate and
individual worship we need to explore ways of telling
and remembering our foundational myth that are not over
and against, but together with the rest of the Church.
Some years ago I was part of a search committee
screening candidates for a teaching position at our ELCA
college.9 The position was specified to teach Lutheran
theology. However, given that only some 30% of our
student body was Lutheran, we had come to the decision
that this professor needed to be a very ecumenical
Lutheran. I had learned in my own teaching that working
at an ELCA college meant I had to be much LESS
Lutheran than, say, a Lutheran chaplain at a state
university. I had to respect, accept and give validity to
the theological positions of Methodists, Baptists,

Several years ago an ELCA seminary president was
visiting the campus at which I was teaching. I remember
only a single sentence from that day. It was, "Lutherans
need to repent of the Reformation." It was so shocking
as to burn itself indelibly into my memory. If I
remember correctly this was near to the time that Pope
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ourselves in our Lutheranism against a prophetic critique
and to let it unnerve the simplicity of our identity as
Lutherans. If we wish to begin to learn to tell this
foundational myth together with11 rather than over and
against we will have to begin by owning our complicity
in the beginning of12 and continuance of division in the
Body of Christ. We will have to learn both sides of our
myth, its dark side as well as its glorious side. We need
to mix repentance for the dark together with celebration
of the glory. And, perhaps even more difficult, we will
need to begin to relativize the glory we identify in our
theological heritage in the context of a God who speaks
through others than just us. When we invite Baptists,
Pentecostals, Catholics, and the new Evangelicals to
come and teach us on Reformation Sunday we will have
begun to own a new relationship to our foundational
myths and will have begun a worthy celebration of the
Reformation for the whole Church.

John Paul II had begun initiatives for Catholics to repent
of institutional failures across the centuries. Perhaps this
had influenced his statement. But it comes back to haunt
me periodically.
If the Reformation itself was/is a mixed bag, so should
our celebration of it on its festival day be. I envision the
celebrant standing to say, "Today we gather to repent of
our sins in the Reformation!" "Today the Church gathers
to celebrate Reformation Sunday!" The juxtapositioning
of such a discordant proclamation gets at knocking us out
of our complacency about the inherent goodness,
righteousness, of our theological and institutional
identity. Dealing with it in this paradoxical manner is
curiously more Lutheran than only telling one side of the
myth. To do so would address liturgically the way in
which Lutheranism, if understood as protest against all
human ism-ing, de-centers itself and would view such a
de-centering of the ism as a good thing. It is to read

Thomas W. Martin is professor of religion at Susquehanna University in Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania.
Notes
1

Simone de Beauvoir's sense of "other," not Emmanuel Levinas'.
It was preached by Rev. Mark Radecke, Chaplain to the University, Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, PA, not only to celebrate
the Reformation, but also to commemorate the 25th anniversary of his ordination to the ministry of Word and Sacrament.
3
E.g. www.saintjosephcathedral.org/sitemaplbulletins!Bulletins_2000/l0292000.htm
4
I almost always avoid any red clothing on Reformation Day. I know that the overt message is of the Church's foundation in the
blood of Christ and the Martyrs. But the covert message is of the towns and villages of Europe turned blood red by the slaughter of
children, women, old men, as well as soldiers, all to glorify Jesus. This makes the liturgical red tradition a participation in Christian
imperialist triumphalism I can no longer stomach.
5
Just recently I had a conversation with a fellow church member who was proudly telling me of his son-in-law's doctoral research in
Spain on Spanish persecution of Lutherans. The story was told with pregnant body language and vocal emphasis to indicate that
"they" persecuted, "we" didn't.
6
Cf. Regina Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago: 1997).
7
Found in my unscientific survey at www.tribune.org/Archivesffribune/2002/0ctoberPg30.shtml
8
Cf. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto and Derek Wilson, Reformations:A Radical Interpretation of Christianity and the World ( 1500-2000),
(New York: Scribner's, 1996).
9
Midland Lutheran College, Fremont, NE.
1
°First laid out in a series of articles in the 1970s: esp. ''From Isaiah 61 to Luke 4" in Christianity, Judaism and Other Greco-Roman
Cults, Ed. Jacob Neusner (Leiden, E.J. Brill: 1975).
11
It must be acknowledged that such explorations are beginning and services planned to focus on reconciliation over division do exist.
12
This is not to forget that Catholics and the Orthodox have a whole other context to deal with this in light of the Great Schism, which
predates our contribution to Christian division by 500 years.
2
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The Ought
Ned Wisnefske

Nobody likes the Ought. Everyone tries to flee from the
Ought whenever it comes around, or even deny it exists.

encounters us?) Once more, when the Ought starts to
enter, we close the classroom door.

Moral education is all about the Ought: we ought to do
this; we ought not to do that. There is opposition to
moral education in college, from students as well as
faculty, because not even they want to hear this or be
around the Ought. Some say (with respects to Dr. Seuss),
"You cannot teach morals to college students because it
is too late. They have already been formed by family,
school, church, and state." Or else you hear, "You
cannot teach values to college students because that
would mold them. You must only expose them, not
compose them."

This fear and denial of the Ought tells us something
important about ourselves. For one, the fact that we feel
threatened shows that we sense the presence of the
Ought. How else do we explain our contradictory
objections to the moral formation of students, or why we
protest so zealously against it? If the Ought were really
nothing, we would simply ignore it, as we would the
claim that there is a ghost in the room. We feel
threatened because we realize that the Ought intends to
shape us. That is why we flee from it and even deny it
exists. Evidently we have the mind, heart, and will to
sense the Ought, to respond to it, and to be shaped by it,
yet we do not want to use those capacities. Finally, what
does it say about us that we realize something exists, yet
refuse to respond to it and even deny it? It says that there
is something obstinate about our moral nature. This
entrenched stubbornness, whatever it is, prevents us from
seeing moral demand before our eyes, and obstructs
moral education.

Now note something about these two very common
claims: they make opposite assumptions.
The first
complaint assumes that students are already formed (and
can no longer be shaped morally), whereas the second
charge assumes that students are not formed (and should
shape themselves). Curiously, you hear both objections
out of the same mouth in the same conversation: "You
cannot teach morals because students' morals are already
formed." "You cannot teach morals because you will
form students' morals." Both cannot be true.

How might we overcome this obstinacy? Can we get the
Ought in the classroom without causing students and
faculty to flee? As we have seen, we refuse to see the
Ought in front of us; but we might sense it behind us,
nudging us. Perhaps there we can hear its presence and
not close our ears, feel its breath and its clasp on our
shoulders and not cover up.

Why do we hear these contradictory objections to moral
formation? The answer is that both share the same fear,
the fear of the Ought. As is often the case, opposites are
joined by a common threat. In this case, both feel
threatened by the demands posed by the Ought. They
feel threatened because the Ought intends to shape them
in ways they do not want. So when students meet moral
demands in the classroom and feel the presence of the
Ought they will say, "The Ought cannot be real. Since
our upbringings are so diverse, and we see things so
differently, the Ought has to be something different for
each us." In this way they convince themselves that the
Ought is not actually there in the classroom with them at
all, but only their personal, pet oughts-which is not the
real animal. Or, when some faculty find out that the
Ought has been allowed into the classroom, they
complain, "The Ought must leave. There must only be
oughts in the room. Only those oughts are allowed which
we choose to be oughts." In so professing they too
banish the Ought, since an ought we choose is really not
the Ought at all. (A clever way to deny the Ought
while appearing to acknowledge it-is to allow that we
each already have oughts we bring with us, so why
concern ourselves with the Ought which supposedly

It might work this way. Let students and faculty begin by
supposing that there really could be an Ought. (Isn't it
possible that moral demand encounters us and is not
invented by us? That the difference between right and
wrong is objective and not subjective?) Then, let us see
whether we might find out what the Ought is, if together
we search for it by using our moral capacities: examining
our moral senses, applying the rules common to us, and
weighing our moral judgments, discerning the better ones
from the worse.
When we do that we may not find the Ought, though it
will find us; for then we will realize that the persons
participating in this enterprise deserve respect. To
exercise our capacities to be impartial, to sympathize, and
to exert our free will gives us distinction and sets us apart
as beings with dignity. To realize this is to be grasped by
the claim that humans should and should not be treated in
certain ways. When that happens the Ought has entered
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to think clearly, our hearts to feel genuinely, and our
wills to act rightly. The Ought can reform the formations
of our past, and transform our wants to give purpose to
our future.

the room and nudged us. Then we can no longer deny it,
and we will realize that we need not fear it, though we
might be awed by it.
This might seem like a small thing, a naught rather than
the Ought, but in that little thing is contained most
everything. For it is the Ought which shapes our minds

It is never, therefore, too late, or a mistake, to be shaped
by the Ought.

Ned Wisnefske is professor of religion and philosophy at Roanoke College in Salem, Virginia.
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Un possible
Tim Knopp

Some say childhood ends in the period between high school
and college, that in growing up you make a trade off
like bartering baseball cards with the neighbor, "I'll give you late night talks with friends
foooor a career in education. Or how 'bout two Wet Willy's for a Jack Daniels?"
It seems fair, maybe, that this should be, as I twist
the shower knobs and test the water with a single sandled foot. I step
into the warm stream, stand a moment before bathing.
I've given four years to this higher education, four years closer
to some hidden knowledge, four years farther from what I once knew,
four years of reading Emerson, watching "The Simpsons,"
thinking, Me fail English? That's unpossible. The chimes ring
in the afternoon sun. It's noon and the ding-ding-BONG of the bells
pulls me to the heart of the warm, bubbling campus.
Around the grassy courtyard, strewn bodies teach strewn bodies
about relationships, advice about hard topics coming all too easy.
They read a poem, write a song, talk the physics of cigarette ash
and how long it can grow before falling, clumped or floating
on the wind, from their scissored fingers. Along the worn brick paths
professors walk side by side with students, taste an apple
between classes, hear the latest political news, or ask
squirrelly freshmen, "What is love?" They don't know, of course,
that the answer doesn't start, "Love is," but rather "Love can be."
For now I spend evenings with friends, say, "You should have heard
what this kid in my second period class said," or just play Tecmo
Super Bowl on the original Nintendo, an old school game for those
trying to remember their old school days.
Tim Knopp graduated from Capital University as an education major on May 8, 2004.
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